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Abstract
We study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus
is on equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality each players strategy is
optimal at each information set given opponentsstrategies. We show sequential op-
timality, which does not make any explicit assumption on updating, is equivalent to
sequential optimality with respect to beliefs updated using a particular generalization
of Bayesian updating. Ambiguity aversion expands the set of equilibria compatible
with players sharing common ambiguous beliefs. We connect ambiguity aversion with
belief robustness. Examples illustrate new strategic behavior, including strategic use
of ambiguity, under ambiguity aversion.
1 Introduction
Dynamic games of incomplete information are the subject of a large literature, both theory
and application, with diverse elds including models of rm competition, agency theory,
auctions, search, insurance and many others. In such games, how players perceive and react
to uncertainty, and the way it evolves over the course of the game, is of central importance. In
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the theory of decision making under uncertainty, preferences that allow for decision makers to
care about ambiguity1 have drawn increasing interest (Gilboa and Marinacci, 2013). That
ambiguity may remain relevant in a steady-state has been demonstrated in e.g., Epstein
and Schneider (2003b), Maccheroni and Marinacci (2005) and Klibano¤, Marinacci and
Mukerji (2009). We propose equilibrium notions for incomplete information games involving
ambiguity about parameters (which could be, for example, privately known types of players).
The parameter space is a modelling device to allow for players to be uncertain (which in
our setting may include both ambiguity and risk) about the payo¤s they and the others
face and/or the strategies played by the other players. This allows us to examine e¤ects
of introducing ambiguity aversion in strategic settings, static and dynamic. The denition
and analysis of solution concepts capturing dynamic considerations, such as optimality of
continuation strategies at each information set, are the main contributions of the paper.
Such optimality is absent from almost all existing literature on games with ambiguity averse
players.
In our analysis, players have smooth ambiguity preferences (Klibano¤, Marinacci and
Mukerji, 2005) and may be ambiguity averse. Such preferences for a player i evaluate a
behavior strategy prole  by
X
2()
i
 X
2
Ui(; )()
!
i () ,
where  is the parameter space modeling the incomplete information, i is a subjective
probability over  () (i.e., a second-order probability over ), Ui(; ) is is expected
payo¤ from  given , and i is an increasing function, the concavity of which reects
ambiguity aversion. All else equal, as i becomes more concave, player i becomes more
ambiguity averse (see e.g., Theorem 2 in Klibano¤, Marinacci, Mukerji 2005). The presence
of ambiguity is captured by non-degeneracy of i. In the smooth ambiguity model it is
possible to hold the playersinformation xed (by xing i) while varying their ambiguity
attitude from aversion to neutrality (i.e., replacing a more concave i with an a¢ ne one,
which reduces preferences to expected utility). This facilitates a natural way to understand
the e¤ect of introducing ambiguity aversion into a strategic environment. Our focus is on
extensive form games, specically multistage games with perfect recall, and on equilibrium
notions capturing perfection analogous to those in standard theories for ambiguity neutral
players, such as subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965), sequential equilibrium (Kreps
and Wilson, 1982) and perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole,
1In this literature, ambiguity refers to subjective uncertainty about probabilities (see e.g., Ghirardato,
2004).
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1991a,b).
We use as a running example a variation on the peace negotiation game proposed by
Greenberg (2000) motivated by the common practice of governments to manipulate expecta-
tions of rewards and punishments so as to encourage negotiating parties to cooperate. The
game involves two small countries in peace negotiations but who, left on their own, would
not agree to peace, and a large country that has the power to a¤ect the small countries and
desires peace between them. The large country hopes to induce cooperation by the small
countries by leading each to believe that it will likely be punished by the large country if ne-
gotiations break down (or favored if negotiations succeed). However, uncertainty created by
any single mixture over which country to punish is inadequate to induce both small countries
to agree to peace. More precisely, for the payo¤s in the example, any (mixture over) choice of
whom to punish/favor that the large country might make contingent on the success/failure
of the negotiation is insu¢ cient to convince both small countries to reach agreement any
mixture that punishes one of them often enough is inadequate to incentivize the other. This
is true irrespective of ambiguity aversion. However, if the small countries are ambiguity
averse, the large country can, by taking steps to obscure the likelihood of who will be pun-
ished/favored, create ambiguity in the minds of the small countries and push both of them
towards peace. Given su¢ cient ambiguity aversion of the small countries, it is thus in the
strategic interest of the large countrys government to try to behave in a way that makes it
di¢ cult for both negotiating parties to be condent that it will not be punishing that party
with high probability if negotiations break down.
We would like to model such behavior as an equilibrium (i.e., all parties best responding to
the strategies of the others), capturing, through the use of ambiguous incomplete information
about parameters and the possibility of conditioning strategies on such parameters, the idea
that, in the presence of ambiguity aversion, some players may choose to play in a manner
that is perceived as ambiguous. In the context of the example, one can think of this use of
ambiguous incomplete information about parameters as a reduced form way of accounting
for the fact that opportunities for fully learning which (mixture over) actions the large
country will play after the negotiation are restricted. Motivation for such a reduced form
may be, for instance, that political parties hold government o¢ ce only temporarily and,
over their time in o¢ ce, mediate negotiations that are not identical, plausibly giving its
strategies an unpredictably changing nature that Bewley (1988, p.35) identies as essential
when discussing how Knightianuncertainty may exist in a steady state. Or it may be that
players see only coarse descriptions of the parameter proles realized in previous plays of
the game, implying that they are not able to pin down a unique empirical frequency for the
parameter prole (coarse observability motivates, e.g., Lehrer (2012)s notion of equilibrium
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with partially specied probabilities).
The uncertainty in a game could also be about payo¤s (e.g., an entry game where the
entrant is uncertain about the incumbents cost as in Section 5.2) and, because of the relative
novelty of the situation to one or more players, it is plausible that they (e.g., the entrant) view
the uncertainty at least partially as ambiguity. In that example, the entrant is expert enough
to gure out what (possibly mixed) action the incumbent would deploy were they to know the
realized cost. However, unlike the incumbent, since the entrant has not actively participated
in the market/industry they are entering, the entrant is not privy to the (possibly stochastic)
law governing the realized cost, and also, unlike the incumbent, does not directly see the
realized cost before having to make the entry decision. Thus we model the entrant as
having ambiguous uncertainty about the parameter (e.g., cost) while being knowledgeable
enough (e.g., about optimal pricing practices given costs and demand) to correctly anticipate
the incumbents best response (e.g., pricing strategy) contingent on the parameter. More
generally, except for the ambiguous nature of the parameter uncertainty, this combination
of uncertainty about parameters and correct anticipation of strategic behavior given the
parameter is central to the standard notion of Bayesian (Nash) equilibrium (BNE). This
motivates the approach of this paper, which starts by generalizing BNE with regard to the
uncertainty about parameters and how players react to that uncertainty.
We rst dene an ex-ante (Nash) equilibrium concept allowing for aversion to ambiguity
about parameters. When there is no parameter uncertainty, this is simply Nash equilibrium
under complete information. When there are common beliefs and ambiguity neutrality,
it becomes Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Next, we rene ex-ante equilibrium by imposing
perfection in the form of a sequential optimality requirement each player is strategy must
be optimal at each information set given the strategies of the other players and is beliefs
at that information set. Sequential optimality does not make any explicit assumption on
updating. When all players are ambiguity neutral, the denition of sequential optimality
reduces to the denition of ex-ante equilibrium plus Kreps and Wilson (1982)s sequential
rationality. In this ambiguity neutral case, our results show that sequential optimality is
equivalent to the version of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) described in Gibbons (1992,
Chapter 4.1) despite the fact that Bayesian updating is assumed in the latter. As with PBE,
a main motivation for sequential optimality is ruling out ex-ante equilibria that depend
crucially on non-credible o¤-path behavior and doing so in a way that strengthens subgame
perfection. Sequential optimality and our subsequent analysis and extensions of it are the
main contributions of the paper.
We show that sequential optimality is equivalent to sequential optimality with respect
to beliefs updated using the smooth rule (Hanany and Klibano¤ 2009), a generalization of
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Bayesian updating for smooth ambiguity preferences, which coincides with Bayesrule under
ambiguity neutrality.2 Thus, we show that analysis of sequential optima of a game may be
undertaken under the as if assumption that all players use smooth rule updating, and in this
sense, that sequential optimality, which does not assume particular updating, nonetheless
provides a way of cutting through the vexing issue of what update rule to impose in dynamic
games with ambiguity aversion. Moreover, we show that under a slight strengthening of
the smooth rule, the absence of protable one-stage deviations can be used for verifying
sequential optimality.
Our characterization of sequential optimality implies that it does not e¤ectively restrict
player is beliefs at information sets immediately following a deviation (though it does ef-
fectively restrict beliefs at o¤-path information sets that are not immediately o¤-path). We
propose a renement of sequential optimality restricting such beliefs: sequential equilibrium
with ambiguity (SEA). In addition to sequential optimality, SEA imposes a generalization
of Kreps and Wilson (1982)s consistency condition from their denition of sequential equi-
librium. Our as ifresult on updating under sequential optimality motivates the use of the
smooth rule in this generalization. We show that in the denition of SEA, sequential opti-
mality may be equivalently replaced by the absence of protable one-stage deviations. This
implies that checking only one-stage deviations with respect to smooth rule consistent beliefs
is su¢ cient to establish that a strategy prole is an SEA. Under ambiguity neutrality, SEA
and sequential equilibrium are equivalent. Finally, we establish that SEA exist for any nite
multistage game with perfect recall and incomplete information, and for any specication of
playersambiguity aversions and ex-ante beliefs.
Section 4.1 provides results on comparative statics of the equilibrium set in ambiguity
aversion that apply to any of the above three notions of equilibrium. First, for xed beliefs,
ambiguity aversion may change the equilibrium set in a variety of ways  it can expand,
shrink or simply change the set of equilibria. Second, we take the point of view of an outside
observer who is not willing to assume particular beliefs when describing the equilibrium
predictions of the theory. Holding payo¤s and the structure of the game xed, ambiguity
aversion expands the set of equilibria compatible with players sharing a common belief (i.e.,
i =  for all players i, running over all possible ). Common beliefs are essential to this
result. With unrestricted heterogeneous beliefs (i.e., running over all possible i), ambiguity
aversion does not a¤ect the set of equilibria. If, as in some existing literature, we were
instead to limit attention to pure strategies (both in terms of the equilibrium prole and,
2Under ambiguity aversion, the smooth rule may be thought of as applying Bayesrule to the measure
in the local linear approximation of preferences at the given strategy prole. Such local measures have
previously proved useful in economics and decision theory. See e.g., Rigotti, Shannon and Strzalecki (2008),
Hanany and Klibano¤ (2009), Ghirardato and Siniscalchi (2012).
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crucially, in terms of the deviations against which optimality is checked), ambiguity aversion
expands the set of such equilibria even when we run over unrestricted heterogeneous beliefs.
Ambiguity averse behavior is often viewed as a robust response to doubts about beliefs
(e.g., Hansen (2007)). We describe a sense in which this robustness extends to properties of
equilibria. Section 4.2 denes robustness of an equilibrium to increases in ambiguity aversion
and shows that this is related to a type of belief robustness (Theorem 4.5).
Section 5 contains an example of a Milgrom and Roberts (1982)-style limit pricing entry
game with ambiguity about the incumbents cost. We show that limit pricing arises in an
SEA. The limit pricing in our example is part of a semi-pooling equilibrium and succeeds in
deterring some entry. Pooling equilibria are often sensitive to beliefs. We provide conditions
under which this limit pricing is robust to increased ambiguity aversion on the part of the
entrant and then apply Theorem 4.5 to conclude that under these same conditions ambiguity
aversion can make the set of beliefs supporting limit pricing as large as desired.
Another example in Section 5 is a principal, multi-agent communication game. The
principal is shown to strictly benet from conditioning his cheap talk message to the agents on
a payo¤ irrelevant ambiguous event. Our analysis of this example establishes that increasing
the ambiguity of communication can be sequentially optimal, and, moreover, can occur as
part of an SEA. In the context of communication games and mechanism design, sequential
optimality may be viewed as ensuring that players both react optimally to any information
they receive and that participation or design are taken optimally from an ex-ante perspective.
Section 6 discusses some possible extensions of our approach, including to other models
of ambiguity averse playerspreferences. Finally, in addition to the discussion of alternative
approaches in Section 3.2.1, Section 7 discusses closely related literature (especially Battigalli
et al. (2017) and Pahlke (2018)) and compares it to our theory. A supplementary appendix
contains all proofs and some further analysis.
2 Model
We begin by dening the central domain of the paper, nite multistage games with incom-
plete information and perfect recall where players have (weakly) ambiguity averse smooth
ambiguity preferences. It is on this domain that we develop and apply our equilibrium con-
cepts. Such games allow for both imperfectly observed actions and private observations as
the game proceeds. Other than perfect recall and niteness, the multistage structure (i.e.,
the assumption that all players move simultaneously at each point) is the additional poten-
tial limitation on the game forms we consider. While not entirely without loss of generality,
if one doesnt object to giving a player singleton action sets at stages where this player
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has no realmove, the multistage assumption is not restrictive. Note that (nite) normal
form games with incomplete information and (weakly) ambiguity averse smooth ambiguity
preferences are the special case where there is a single stage.
Formally, a nite extensive-form multistage game with incomplete information and perfect
recall and (weakly) ambiguity averse smooth ambiguity preferences,  , is a tuple (N; H;
(Ii)i2N ; (i)i2N ; (ui; i)i2N) where:
 N is the nite set of players.
 H is the nite set of (terminal) histories, each of which is a nite sequence of length
T + 2 of the form h = (h 1; (h0;i)i2N ; : : : ; (hT;i)i2N).
For 0  t  T + 1, let H t  fht  (h 1; (h0;i)i2N ; : : : ; (ht 1;i)i2N) j h 2 Hg be the set
of partial histories up to (but not including) stage t. The set of all partial histories is
H  f;g[S0tT+1H t. For each i 2 N , 0  t  T and ht 2 H t, Ai(ht)  fh^t;i j h^ 2
H; h^t = htg is the set of actions available to player i at ht. The set of initial partial
histories,   H0, is called the set of parametersor types.
 Ii 
S
0tT Iti are the information sets for player i, where each Iti is a partition of H t
such that, for all ht; h^t 2 H t, h^t 2 Ii(ht) implies Ai(ht) = Ai(h^t) (where Ii(ht) is the
unique element of Iti containing ht).
Perfect recall means: for each player i, stage 0  t  T and partial histories ht; h^t 2 H t,
Ii(h
t) = Ii(h^
t) implies Ri(ht) = Ri(h^t), where, for each partial history ht 2 H t, Ri(ht)
is the ordered list of information sets i encounters and the actions i takes under ht.3
 ui : H ! R is the (utility) payo¤ of player i given the history.4
 i is a probability over  () having nite support such that
P
2()
i()() > 0 for
all i 2 N and  2 , where  () is the set of all probability measures over .5
 i : co(ui(H)) ! R is a continuously di¤erentiable, (weakly) concave and strictly
increasing function.
The rst three bullet points above describe the game form, while the rest describe pref-
erences. Observe that at each partial history each player (not just those with non-trivial
3Formally, Ri(ht)  ((Ii(hs); hs;i)0s<t; Ii(ht)). For future reference, note that we extend both Ai and
Ri to information sets in the natural way.
4As is usual for preferences in games, we assume that ui may be extended to a larger domain such that
ui(H) is interior to the convex hull of the image of ui on the larger domain, and that i may be similarly
extended. This ensures the validity of the interior optimality characterizations we use throughout.
5All of our results (except for Theorem 4.3) also hold if the class of games is restricted to those with a
common  such that i =  for all players i. None of our examples rely on di¤erences in the i.
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Figure 2.1: A peace negotiation game
The vectors give utility payo¤s for players 1, 2 and 3, in that order, for each path.
moves at this point) has an information set. The non-standard preference parts of this den-
ition are i and i which are part of the specication of smooth ambiguity preferences, with
the degree of concavity of i reecting ambiguity aversion and i indicating the presence of
ambiguity when suppi contains multiple probability measures.
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We remark that the parameter spacemay possibly include payo¤relevant and/or payo¤
irrelevant components. The role of payo¤ irrelevant components is to facilitate our modeling
of the strategic use of ambiguity via conditioning actions on these components.
Though largely standard, as formal objects such games might seem complex. To aid
understanding, we next introduce a concrete example to which we will return at several
points.
Running Example: The game in Figure 2.1 is a variation on the main example in
Greenberg (2000). There are three players. Players 1 and 2 are small countries involved
in peace negotiations. Player 3 is a large country that has the power to a¤ect the small
countries. The parameter space is  = fI; IIg and represents payo¤ irrelevant private
information of player 3. Specically, one should think of this parameter as the outcome of
an ambiguous device that player 3 has access to and may choose to condition its action on.
At t = 0, only player 1 has a non-trivial move, which is either to c(ooperate) or to d(efect)
in the negotiations. If player 1 plays c, then player 2 observes this and may choose either to
c(ooperate) or to d(efect) in the negotiations. If both 1 and 2 cooperate, the negotiation leads
6supp denotes the support of a measure.
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to peace, and then player 3 chooses between favoring 1 under the peace (f1) and favoring 2
under the peace (f2). The favored country receives a payo¤ (ui) of 5, while the other players
receive 4. If either player defects, then negotiations break down. At that point, player 3,
knowing that negotiations have failed, but not able to observe which country defected, must
choose between an action that punishes player 1 (p1), an action that punishes player 2 (p2),
and a neutral action (n). A player who is punished gets payo¤ 0, while the unpunished
country is favored and gets a payo¤ of 10. If player 3 punishes, it prefers to punish the
defector: player 3s payo¤ is 1 when punishing the defector, and 0 when punishing the other
player. Player 3 staying neutral leads to a payo¤ of 6 for players 1 and 2, and a payo¤ of
x for player 3. The payo¤ of 6 means that both small countries would prefer negotiations
to fail if they knew there would be no punishment. We leave x as a variable in order to
capture di¤erent relative merits for player 3 of staying neutral compared to punishing. A
(terminal) history h consists of complete path through the game tree. For example, one
history is (I; c; c; f2) and (I),(I; c) and (I; c; c) are partial histories.7
The beliefs  for all players are 1
2
-1
2
over distributions 1 and 2 with 1(I) = 1 and
2(I) = 0, reecting the common perception of the ambiguity concerning . The starkness
of the s is purely for convenience any beliefs reecting ambiguity about whether I or II
is more likely would su¢ ce for our analysis. 
A strategy for player i species the distribution over is actions conditional on each
information set of player i. Formally:
Denition 2.1 (Behavior Strategy) A (behavior) strategy for player i in a game   is a
function i such that i (Ii) 2 (Ai(Ii)) for each Ii 2 Ii.
Let i denote the set of all strategies for player i. A strategy prole,   (i)i2N , is a
strategy for each player.
Given a strategy prole , history h and 0  r  t  T + 1, the probability of reaching
ht starting from hr is p(htjhr) 
Q
j2N
Q
rs<t
j (Ij(h
s)) (hs;j).8 It is useful to separate this
probability into a part a¤ected only by i and a part a¤ected only by  i. These are
pi;i(h
tjhr)  Q
rs<t
i (Ii(h
s)) (hs;i) and p i; i(h
tjhr) = Q
j 6=i
Q
rs<t
j (Ij(h
s)) (hs;j) respectively,
7To formally write some histories, one may need to include some of the "dummy" actions chosen from
singleton action sets needed to create the multi-stage structure of the game. These actions are not depicted
in the game tree. For example, if player 1 plays d, to keep the multi-stage structure, this must be followed
by a node where all three players have singleton action sets, before arriving at the stage where player 3 has a
non-trivial move. So an example of such a history could be written as (I; (d; ;; ;); (;; ;; ;); (;; ;; n)) where ; is
used to denote such "dummy" actions and the triples represent the actions of players 1; 2 and 3 respectively.
8If r = t, so that the product is taken over an empty set, invoke the convention that a product over an
empty set is 1.
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with pi;i(h
tjhr)p i; i(htjhr) = p(htjhr). With this notation, we can now state formally the
assumption that playersex-ante preferences over strategies are smooth ambiguity preferences
(Klibano¤, Marinacci and Mukerji 2005) with the ui; i and i as specied by the game.
Assumption 2.1 (Ex-ante Preferences) Fix a game  . Ex-ante (i.e., given the empty
partial history), given  i, each player i ranks strategies 0i according to
Vi(
0
i;  i) 
X
2()
i
 X
h2H
ui(h)p(0i; i)(hjh0)(h0)
!
i () . (2.1)
If there were only a single distribution  over parameters, and so no ambiguity, i would be
degenerate and i irrelevant and (2.1) specializes to the usual ex-ante expected payo¤s (i.e.,
the expression in the argument of i) in the context of a game. In the presence of ambiguity
about the parameters, player i aggregates such expected payo¤s for each  2 suppi using i
and beliefs i. Despite this non-linear aggregation, it proves helpful, in understanding both
optimality and the e¤ect of ambiguity aversion on this aggregation, to examine modied
expected payo¤s using local linear approximations.
As is true for any preference represented by a smooth, increasing and concave objective
function, i is optimal if and only if it is optimal according to the local linear approximation
of the objective function around i. In the context of (2.1), i an ex-ante best response to
 i for player i given i and i is equivalent to i maximizing, among all 
0
i, the following
modied expected payo¤, X
h2H
ui(h)pi;0i(hjh0)q(;i);i(h) (2.2)
where q(;i);i is is ex-ante (; i)- local measure over histories, dened for each h 2 H by,
p i; i(hjh0)
X
2()
(h0)0i
0@X
h^2H
ui(h^)p(h^jh^0)(h^0)
1Ai(). (2.3)
Notice that is ambiguity aversion leads the marginal of this local measure on parameters,
h0 2 , to tilt, via the 0i term, towards parameters given more weight by s for which
i expects to fare less well under . This tilting is not present under ambiguity neutrality
(since 0i is constant). As ambiguity aversion increases, this tilting becomes more severe.
Now turn to dening preferences beyond the ex-ante stage. To do so, we need to dene the
notion of a belief at an information set. The only property we require of such a belief is that
it puts weight only on distributions over the partial histories belonging to that information
set. Formally:
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Denition 2.2 (Belief at an Information Set) A belief for player i in a game   given
information set Ii is a nite support probability measure i;Ii over (Ii). An interim belief
system   (i;Ii)i2N;Ii2Ii is a belief for each player at each of that players information sets.
Since at any partial history each player has an information set, an interim belief system
species a belief for each player at each partial history. Given these beliefs, the following
denes a players preferences at an information set:
Assumption 2.2 (Preferences at an Information Set) Fix a game   and a strategy
prole . Any player i at information set Ii ranks strategies 0i according to
Vi;Ii(
0
i;  i) 
X
2(Ii)
i
0@ X
hjht2Ii
ui(h)p(0i; i)(hjht)(ht)
1A i;Ii () , (2.4)
where t is the stage at which the information set Ii occurs.
Compared to the ex-ante preferences given in (2.1), the preferences (2.4) at Ii di¤er only
in that (1) the beliefs may have changed in light of Ii and  (i.e., i is replaced by some belief
i;Ii concentrated on Ii), and (2) the probabilities of reaching various histories according to
the strategy prole are now calculated starting from Ii rather than from the beginning of
the game. Given a strategy i for player i, the continuation strategy at information set Ii,
Iii , is the restriction of i to the information sets I^i such that Ii 2 Ri(I^i). Preferences at
Ii may be equivalently thought of as ranking continuation strategies (i.e., any two strategies
with identical continuations from Ii are treated identically by preferences at Ii).
Just as for the ex-ante preferences, it is useful to observe that i being a best response to
 i for player i at information set Ii given i and i;Ii is equivalent to i maximizing, among
all 0i, the following modied expected payo¤,X
hjht2Ii
ui(h)pi;0i(hjht)q(;);i;Ii(h) (2.5)
where q(;);i;Ii is is (; )- local measure over histories given Ii, dened for each h 2 H such
that ht 2 Ii by,
p i; i(hjht)
X
2(Ii)
0i
0@ X
h^jh^t2Ii
ui(h^)p(h^jh^t)(h^t)
1A (ht)i;Ii(). (2.6)
Now, is ambiguity aversion leads the marginal of this local measure on Ii to tilt towards
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partial histories given more weight by s for which i expects to fare less well under the
continuation Iii .
Using the above preferences, Section 3 turns to equilibrium analysis. The main focus is
describing and analyzing sequential optimality the assumption that each player is best re-
sponding to  i according to their preferences at each information set including its relation
with updating of beliefs. Observe that Denition 2.2 assumes no particular connection be-
tween beliefs at di¤erent information sets, the ex-ante beliefs, and the strategy prole. Our
Theorem 3.1 will show that strategic behavior under sequential optimality is as if beliefs are
related by a particular update rule. In the case of expected utility preferences, this update
rule is exactly Bayesrule given the strategy prole. More generally, this update rule ensures
that, given the strategy prole, is local measure at Ii, q(;);i;Ii , is the Bayesian update of
is local measure at the previous information set (or of is ex-ante local measure if Ii is an
initial information set).
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Ex-ante Equilibrium
As a step toward dening sequential optimality, we use the ex-ante preferences to dene
ex-ante (Nash) equilibrium:
Denition 3.1 (Ex-ante Equilibrium) Fix a game  . A strategy prole  is an ex-ante
(Nash) equilibrium if, for all players i,
Vi()  Vi(0i;  i)
for all 0i 2 i.
An equilibrium requires each player i, given ex-ante beliefs i, to best respond to the
(parameter-contingent) strategies of the other players. To the extent that the play that
strategies specify varies with the parameter, ambiguity about parameters (as reected in be-
liefs) translates into ambiguity about play in equilibrium. In the case of ambiguity neutrality,
where the i are linear (i.e., subjective expected utility), and homogeneous ex-ante beliefs,
i =  for all players i, the denition reduces to the usual (ex-ante) Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium denition. More generally, ex-ante equilibrium is the same as the ex-ante equilibrium
dened in the context of strategic form games with ambiguity averse players by Azrieli and
Teper (2011) applied to our setting of extensive form games and smooth ambiguity prefer-
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ences. Similar ex-ante concepts also appear in Kajii and Ui (2005), Bade (2011), Riedel and
Sass (2013), Kellner (2015) and Grant, Meneghel and Tourky (2016).
When there is ambiguity about parameters, the motive for conditioning play on them can
come from a mix of direct payo¤ concerns and/or indirect strategic advantage from having
others be ambiguous about ones play. When, however, some or all of the parameter space is
payo¤ irrelevant, the only motive for conditioning play on these payo¤ irrelevant aspects is
indirect strategic advantage. This approach to modeling purestrategic ambiguity in equi-
librium via strategies conditioning play on payo¤ irrelevant parameters follows Bade (2011),
who extends to ambiguity Aumann (1974)s modeling of equilibrium strategic uncertainty
through conditioning on such parameters.
An alternative approach is to model ambiguity directly over opponentsstrategies without
requiring a parameter space. In any such approach, unlike in ours, the Nash assumption
that each player is best responding to the strategies of the others is problematic as it leaves
no possibility of strategic ambiguity. Thus, such approaches, while maintaining that each
players strategy is a best response to their beliefs about strategies, necessarily relax the
assumption that these beliefs are correct. Examples of such approaches in the literature
include Dow and Werlang (1992), Klibano¤ (1996), Lo (1996, 1999), Eichberger and Kelsey
(2000), Marinacci (2000), Lehrer (2012), Battigalli et al. (2015) and Battigalli et al. (2017).
When there is some ambiguity aversion (one or more i concave) and ambiguity ( non-
degenerate), ex-ante equilibrium behavior can di¤er from that in Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Intuition for this is that at an ex-ante equilibrium, each player is behaving as if they maximize
expected payo¤ with respect to their local measure (2.3) at that strategy prole. Even with
common beliefs , ambiguity averse players will generally have di¤erent local measures, in
particular, di¤erent local marginals on parameters. Thus, ambiguity aversion leads players
with common beliefs to act, locally, as if they were standard ambiguity neutral players with
heterogeneous beliefs.
Running Example continued: Returning to the peace negotiation example, we an-
alyze the ex-ante equilibria of the game which helps illustrate some of the above. First,
suppose that both small countries are ambiguity neutral (i.e., 1 and 2 are a¢ ne). In this
case, no ex-ante equilibrium results in a positive probability of peace. In contrast, whenever
players 1 and/or 2 are su¢ ciently ambiguity averse (e.g., 1 = 2 =  e ax with a  ln(54)),
peace with probability 1 is an ex-ante equilibrium outcome. Formally:
Proposition 3.1 (i) If players 1 and 2 are ambiguity neutral (i.e., 1 and 2 are a¢ ne),
no ex-ante equilibrium results in a positive probability of peace. This also holds for any other
specication of common belief .
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(ii) If players 1 and/or 2 are su¢ ciently ambiguity averse, there is an ex-ante equilibrium
yielding peace with probability 1 (i.e.,with 1(c) = 2(c) = 1).
The proof of this and all subsequent results in the paper may be found in the Appendices.
Intuitively, players 1 and 2 are willing to cooperate only if each is su¢ ciently worried that
they will be punished if negotiations break down. Given the specied payo¤s and beliefs
in combination with ambiguity neutrality, this is impossible because any strategy of 3 that
incentivizes one of them to cooperate will lead the other to defect. Peace does not occur in
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
How do ambiguity and ambiguity aversion change the story? Consider the strategy prole
where 1 and 2 cooperate and player 3, when the payo¤ irrelevant parameter is I, punishes 1 if
there is defection and favors 2 if there is peace, and does the opposite when the parameter is
II. Since the beliefs  reect ambiguity about the parameters, 3s strategy creates ambiguity
in the minds of players 1 and 2 about who will be punished or favored. Observe that player
1 does worse under parameter I than under parameter II and the reverse is true for player
2. Recall from the discussion following equation (2.3) that ambiguity aversion would then,
at this strategy prole, tilt the marginals of their local measures on parameters in di¤erent
directions 1s towards I and 2s towards II. Given su¢ cient ambiguity aversion (to generate
enough tilting), cooperation will be a best response for both because deviating is unattractive
under parameter I for player 1 and unattractive under parameter II for player 2. Finally,
given cooperation by 1 and 2, any strategy of player 3 is an ex-ante best response because 3
is indi¤erent among all actions that follow cooperation, and actions following defection are
o¤ the equilibrium path. 
Observe that, as in the example, equilibrium disciplines the strategic ambiguity that
appears. Given that a player knows that by conditioning his play on ambiguous parameters
he can induce strategic ambiguity in the minds of others, the decision to condition in this
manner is a decision about whether it is advantageous to play ambiguously. Equilibrium
requires that such ambiguity inducing play is permitted only when it is a best response.
3.2 Sequential Optimality
Fundamental to our theory will be sequential optimality. It requires that, given the strategies
of the others, each players strategy is optimal at each of that players information sets. Since
at each partial history each player has an information set containing that partial history,
sequential optimality imposes an analogue of ex ante equilibrium at each partial history in
the game. Under ambiguity neutrality, the denition of sequential optimality specializes to
ex-ante equilibrium plus Kreps and Wilson (1982)s sequential rationality. Formally:
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Denition 3.2 Fix a game  . A pair (; ) consisting of a strategy prole and interim belief
system is sequentially optimal if, for all players i and all information sets Ii,
Vi()  Vi(0i;  i) (3.1)
and
Vi;Ii()  Vi;Ii(0i;  i) (3.2)
for all 0i 2 i, where the Vi and Vi;Ii are as specied in (2.1) and (2.4).9
A strategy prole  is said to be sequentially optimal whenever there exists an interim
belief system  such that (; ) is sequentially optimal.
As is standard for perfection-like equilibrium concepts, a major motivation for sequential
optimality is to rule out non-credible o¤-path behavior, and o¤-path restrictions are the only
means through which it renes ex-ante equilibrium. Any ex-ante equilibrium for which all
information sets are on-path is also sequentially optimal (see Theorem A.1 in the Appendix).
How does sequential optimality relate to familiar concepts? Sequential optimality with a
common  implies (and is stronger than) subgame perfection adapted to allow for smooth
ambiguity preferences. To see this, recall that a proper subgame follows a partial history at
which all information sets are singletons. Since in our games all players have an information
set at each partial history, for any proper subgame (3.2) ensures that the continuation
strategy prole derived from  forms an ex-ante equilibrium of the subgame with respect to
degenerate beliefs. For the overall game, (3.1) ensures  is an ex-ante equilibrium. When
preferences are expected utility and there is a common , we show (see Corollary 3.1) that
sequential optimality identies the same strategy proles as the version of Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) dened in Gibbons (1992, pp. 177-180) (sometimes called weak PBE).10
Both PBE and sequential optimality go well beyond subgame perfection in several re-
spects. First, they rule out o¤-path play that is not optimal against any belief given the
strategy prole at partial histories that generate non-singleton information sets (where sub-
game perfection has no bite). Second, if, for example, a simultaneous move game is triggered
immediately following a deviation, they require play of an equilibrium of that incomplete
information simultaneous move game given beliefs and the strategy prole. Note that this
9Note that since Vi;Ii(~i;  i) = Vi;Ii(^i;  i) if ~
Ii
i = ^
Ii
i , requiring the inequalities for the Vi;Ii to hold
as i changes only her continuation strategy given Ii would result in an equivalent denition.
10In games where at some partial histories information sets are specied for only a subset of players (for
example, as is frequently done, only for the player(s) having a non-trivial move at that point), ex-ante
equilibrium plus sequential rationality need not imply subgame perfection (see e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995,
p. 290)s Example 9.C.5) and thus the same is true of sequential optimality. However, once the missing
information sets are added (in the case of Example 9.C.5, specify an information set for the incumbent
containing the partial history In) the implication of subgame perfection is restored.
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second implication is generally more restrictive than simply ruling out strategies that are
(iteratively) strictly dominated given the information set.
Running Example continued: Earlier we showed that only when players 1 and/or
2 are su¢ ciently ambiguity averse is there an ex-ante equilibrium resulting in peace with
probability 1. This equilibrium is also subgame perfect, since there are no o¤-path proper
subgames. Is such behavior sequentially optimal? The answer depends on x, the payo¤player
3 receives when staying neutral after negotiations break down. Only when x is su¢ ciently
low (specically x  1) will there be a sequentially optimal strategy prole leading to peace
for sure (or even to a positive probability of peace). Why? When x > 1, staying neutral is
more attractive for player 3 than punishing, and thus punishment, at least some of which
is necessary to incentivize successful peace negotiations, becomes a non-credible threat and
cannot be sustained as an optimal response to any beliefs after negotiations break down.
When x  1, some ambiguous punishment strategies by 3 (e.g., playing p1 if the parameter
is I and p2 if the parameter is II) are best responses to some beliefs of 3 about who deviated
from playing c. Given su¢ cient ambiguity aversion of players 1 and 2, such punishment
strategies are enough to ensure cooperation. Formally:
Proposition 3.2 If x > 1, then in all sequential optima players 1 and 2 play d with prob-
ability 1. If x  1 and players 1 and 2 are su¢ ciently ambiguity averse, then there is a
sequential optimum yielding peace with probability 1.
Remark 3.1 When 0:5 < x  1, to have a sequential optimum yielding peace with probabil-
ity 1 may require strictly more ambiguity aversion than would be necessary to have an ex-ante
equilibrium doing so. For example, if 1 (x)   e x ln(5=3) =  (53) x (so that 
0
1(x)
01(y)
= (5
3
)y x)
and player 2 is ambiguity neutral, then, as is shown in the proof of Proposition 3.1, there
is an ex-ante equilibrium yielding peace with probability 1. However, there is no sequential
optimum yielding peace with probability 1. The intuition is that when 0:5 < x  1, optimality
for player 3 when given the move limits the ability to punish the less ambiguity averse player
2 by ruling out mixtures that include both p1 and p2. In contrast, when x  0:5 enough
punishment strategies are credible that there is a sequential optimum yielding peace whenever
there is an ex-ante equilibrium doing so.

Do sequential optima always exist? In Section 3.3 we explore a renement of sequential
optimality. We show existence for this renement, thus implying existence of sequential
optima.
The denition of sequential optimality does not assume particular updating. Neverthe-
less, we show that analysis of sequential optima of a game may be undertaken under the as if
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assumption that all players use an update rule, proposed by Hanany and Klibano¤ (2009),
called the smooth rule. Under ambiguity neutrality, the smooth rule reduces to Bayesrule.
More generally, the smooth rule applied to beliefs implies the local measures, q(;);i;Ii(h), as
dened in (2.6), are related by Bayesrule.
We now dene the smooth rule in the game-theoretic context. Though it is notationally
complex, at this point all that is important to take from this denition is that is updated
beliefs are proportional to is beliefs at the previous information set times is subjective
likelihood of reaching from the previous information set to the current one given  i, weighted
by a term (involving a ratio of 0i expressions) that can be non-constant only when the
player is ambiguity averse. Thus, smooth rule updating is a re-weighted version of Bayesian
updating. When this weighting term is constant, as is the case under ambiguity neutrality,
the smooth rule reduces to Bayesrule.11 For clarity, the smooth rule formula is stated in
two pieces, one for updating to an initial information set from the ex-ante stage, and the
other for updating to a current information set from the previous one. The smooth rule pins
down is updating at all information sets (both on and o¤ path) except those that i does not
view as reachable from the immediately preceding information set given . We also dene
a strong version of the smooth rule which additionally pins down updating at information
sets that i does not view as reachable given  only because of is own strategy i (under
ambiguity neutrality, this will be referred to as strong Bayesrule12). Notice, as with Bayes
rule in PBE, that the updating formula applies wherever possibleincluding at all on-path
and some o¤-path information sets. We defer further discussion of the rule, and suggest that
the reader may also wish to defer parsing its formal denition.
Notation 3.1 For information set Ii, dene s(Ii) to be such that Ii 2 Is(Ii)i , i.e., at what
stage of the game is Ii. Given a partial history ht 2 H and  1  s  t  1, hs is the partial
history formed by truncating ht just before stage s.
Notation 3.2 For information set Ii * , dene I 1i to be the information set immediately
preceding Ii in Ri(Ii).
Denition 3.3 An interim belief system  satises the smooth rule using strategy prole 
if the following holds for each player i and information set Ii, letting t denote the stage at
which the information set Ii occurs (i.e., t = s(Ii)):
11More generally, these weighting terms reect di¤erences in the motive to hedge against ambiguity at
di¤erent information sets (see Hanany and Klibano¤ 2009 and Baliga, Hanany and Klibano¤ 2013).
12Such a version of Bayesrule is discussed, e.g., in Hendon, Jacobsen and Sloth (1996) and Perea (2002).
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If Ii  , then for all  2 (Ii),
i;Ii() /
X
^2()j^Ii=
0i
P
h2H
ui(h)p(hjh0)^(h0)

0i
 P
hjht2Ii
ui(h)p(hjht)(ht)
! ^(Ii)i(^), (3.3)
where ^Ii 2 (Ii) is given by ^Ii() = ^()X
^2Ii
^(^)
; and
if Ii *  and
P
ht2Ii
P
^2(I 1i )
p(h
tjht 1)^(ht 1)i;I 1i (^) > 0, then for all  2 (Ii),
i;Ii() /
X
^2(I 1i )j^Ii=
0i
 P
hjht 12I 1i
ui(h)p(hjht 1)^(ht 1)
!
0i
 P
hjht2Ii
ui(h)p(hjht)(ht)
! (3.4)

0@X
ht2Ii
p i; i(h
tjht 1)^(ht 1)
1A i;I 1i (^),
where ^Ii 2 (Ii) is given by ^Ii(ht) =
p i; i (h
tjht 1)^(ht 1)X
h^t2Ii
p i; i (h^
tjh^t 1)^(h^t 1)
for all ht 2 Ii.
If (3.4) additionally holds for all Ii *  for which
P
ht2Ii
P
^2(I 1i )
p i; i(h
tjht 1)^(ht 1)i;I 1i (^) >
0, then we say  satises the strong smooth rule using strategy prole .
We are now ready to state our result that analysis of sequential optima of a game may
be undertaken under the as ifassumption that all players use smooth rule updating.
Theorem 3.1 Fix a game   and a strategy prole . Then  is sequentially optimal if and
only if there exists an interim belief system ^ satisfying the smooth rule using  such that
(; ^) is sequentially optimal.
Outline of the proof: The if direction follows by denition. The only if direction
proceeds by considering each player i and information set Ii separately (and has analogues
for the ex-ante stage). Pair each Ii with its collection of immediate successors Ji. The
argument makes use of the following construction of the interim belief system ^: let  be an
interim belief system such that (; ) is sequentially optimal; at information sets where the
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smooth rule is unrestrictive let ^i;Ii = i;Ii ; given this and the ex-ante beliefs, the smooth
rule formula then pins down ^ at all other information sets.
Three steps are key to showing that (; ^) is sequentially optimal. First, as is true for any
preference represented by a smooth, increasing and concave objective function, i is optimal
at Ii if and only if it is optimal according to the local linear approximation around i given
in (2.5). Second, perfect recall and the linearity of this objective allows us to conclude that
i maximizes (2.5) implies that, for each Ji, i maximizes the part of the summation in (2.5)
taken only over Ji. Finally, the smooth rule formula in (3.4) implies that the (; ^)- local
measure given each Ji is the Bayesian update, given Ji and , of (and therefore proportional
to) the (; ^)- local measure given Ii. Thus, applying this and again the rst step, for each
Ji, i is optimal at Ji given ^. Therefore (; ^) is sequentially optimal. 
Note that Theorem 3.1 would be false if we were to replace the smooth rule with Bayes
rule restricting attention to interim belief systems satisfying Bayesian updating generally
rules out some (or all) sequentially optimal strategies. This is so because applying Bayes
rule to beliefs does not generate Bayesian updating of the local measures, q. The latter was
the implication of smooth rule updating of beliefs essential to proving the theorem.
One characteristic of smooth rule updating that will be unfamiliar to many readers is that
it is non-consequentialistin the sense that its formula includes expected payo¤s under 
at all (terminal) histories reachable from the immediately preceding information set, as well
as ambiguity aversion via i. Importantly however, it is consequentialist in the weaker sense
that preferences at any information set Ii rank strategies only through their continuation
from Ii since beliefs, however determined, are concentrated on measures over Ii. The reader
might nevertheless be worried by the fact that the evaluation of a continuation strategy at
an information set depends on updated beliefs, but updated beliefs under the smooth rule
depend on the continuation strategy at the information set. This should not be a concern,
because the only comparisons that are meaningful when checking if i is a best response to
 i at an information set Ii are those evaluating i and each alternative 0i according to the
same belief, i;Ii, whatever it is. Theorem 3.1 says that this belief may be determined by
updating according to the smooth rule using  = (i;  i).
Non-consequentialist updating more generally has been criticized in the context of dy-
namic decision-making under ambiguity by e.g., Siniscalchi (2009) as violating the spirit
of ambiguity being purely an informational phenomenon, in the sense that it may gen-
erate updated perceptions of ambiguity that depend on contextual factors such as payo¤s
and attitudes. While there are types of analysis which become problematic given non-
consequentialism, such as studies of learning or inference carried out in isolation, separate
from any decision or game context, an important takeaway from our analysis (including
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Theorem 3.2 below on the su¢ ciency of checking one-stage deviations) is that the non-
consequentialism of smooth rule updating doesnt introduce any new conceptual di¢ culties
into the analysis of dynamic games. For example, just as with Bayesian updating, once
one xes some beliefs at an information set, to proceed with analysis of play at that and
successor information sets does not require any knowledge of parts of the game outside of
this continuation sub-tree.
Recall that, restricting attention to expected utility preferences, the smooth rule special-
izes to Bayesrule. In this case, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 3.1 Fix a game   with all players ambiguity neutral and a strategy prole .
Then  is sequentially optimal if and only if there exists an interim belief system ^ satisfying
Bayesrule such that (; ^) is sequentially rational.
Thus, under ambiguity neutrality, sequential optimality identies the same set of strategy
proles as Kreps and Wilson (1982)s sequential rationality plus the assumption of Bayesian
updating given , which are, in turn, the same as perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as
dened in, for example, Gibbons (1992).13
When applying concepts like subgame perfection, PBE and sequential equilibrium, it is
extremely useful, when verifying optimality, to only need to check one-stage deviations
(as opposed to general deviations), i.e., check that for each player i and information set Ii,
there are no protable deviations by i at Ii alone. These one-stage deviations are typically a
small fraction of the deviations available to players. Formally, the absence of these protable
one-stage deviations is the following:
Denition 3.4 The pair (; ) has no protable one-stage deviations if for each player i
and each information set Ii, Vi;Ii()  Vi;Ii(0i;  i) for all 0i agreeing with i everywhere
except possibly at Ii.
For nite horizon games, in the standard ambiguity neutral case and under the assumption
that beliefs are related by strong Bayesrule given the strategy prole , having no protable
one-stage deviations is su¢ cient for sequential optimality of  (see Hendon, Jacobsen and
Sloth 1996). Is there an analogous statement that applies under ambiguity aversion? As we
show next, the answer is yes. In this analogue, the role of strong Bayesian updating given 
is played by the strong smooth rule.
13Shimoji and Watson (1998) prove a related result in the context of dening extensive form rationaliz-
ability  the set of such rationalizable strategies when dened using best responses given any conjectures
about othersplay remains the same when limiting attention to conjectures consistent with Bayesrule.
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Theorem 3.2 Fix a game   and a pair (; ) such that  satises the strong smooth rule
using . Then (; ) is sequentially optimal if and only if (; ) has no protable one-stage
deviations.
3.2.1 Comparison with an alternative approach
Sequential optimality renes ex-ante equilibrium to deal with non-credible threats by re-
quiring players to be optimizing over continuation strategies at each information set given
the strategies of the other players. It follows that for any strategy prole that is not se-
quentially optimal, there must be at least some information set at which some player could
strictly improve by shifting to a di¤erent continuation strategy. However, this has not been
the approach to non-credible threats generally taken in the small body of existing literature
on dynamic games with ambiguity aversion that addresses the issue. These alternative ap-
proaches instead require no protable one-stage deviations (or the slightly stronger Strotzian
consistent planning, see Appendix B) with respect to exogenously imposed particular update
rules.14,15 They start from the principle that, at any information set, players choose only
current actions (or mixtures over actions) rather than continuation strategies. Thus, when
best responding, players take as given not only other playersstrategies, as in our approach,
but also their own future continuation strategy. While such approaches emphasize the con-
icting views of optimality at di¤erent information sets that may arise for a player under
ambiguity aversion when using particular update rules, sequential optimality emphasizes the
unity of a player in requiring that strategies are optimal from the point of view of all of the
players information sets simultaneously, while taking a more agnostic or endogenous view
of updating.
How do such approaches compare with sequential optimality? Without exogenous as-
sumptions on updating, sequential optimality is a stronger requirement than consistent plan-
ning, which is, in turn, stronger than requiring no protable one-stage deviations. It then
follows from Theorem 3.2 that all three concepts are equivalent under strong smooth rule up-
dating. This nding generalizes the fact that under expected utility, the three are equivalent
under strong Bayesrule updating. However, the no protable one-stage deviations and sim-
ilar approaches under ambiguity aversion have been most commonly applied together with
di¤erent updating. In the context of smooth ambiguity preferences, Bayesian updating is
often assumed. As noted earlier, because of the conicts this generates between preferences
at a players di¤erent information sets, this may rule out some (or all) sequential optima.
14Examples of such literature include Bose and Renou (2014), Battigalli et al. (2017), Beauchêne, Li and
Li (2017) and Kellner and Le Quement (2018).
15A second approach appearing in the literature is based on recursive preferences. We relate sequential
optimality to this approach in the latter part of Section 7.
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This may occur even when all information sets are on-path. Thus, di¤erently from sequential
optimality, this approach may eliminate an ex-ante equilibrium by restricting on-path as well
as o¤-path behavior.
Such approaches also di¤er from sequential optimality in the other direction  under
Bayesian updating, some strategy proles that are not even ex-ante equilibria may satisfy no
protable one-stage deviations. One type of such behavior that has been a source of criticism
often discussed in the literature (see e.g., Machina (1989), Siniscalchi (2011)) is a player in
a dynamic decision problem strictly preferring not to obtain freely available information. As
Siniscalchi (2011) explains, information is typically bundled together with the future ability
to condition ones action on that information, and therefore increases the exibility given
to the player at future information sets. When there are conicts between the current and
future objectives of the player, such exibility can be strictly costly for the player at the
current information set. Thus what might appear to be negative value of information is
reinterpreted as valuable information outweighed by a costly increase in future exibility
(or, as more commonly referred to, loss of commitment power). Such behavior cannot occur
under sequential optimality, as future exibility is never costly given the unied agreement on
optimality it entails. The following example illustrates another consequence of this di¤erence
between the approaches:
Example: Consider the game in Figure 3.1. Player 2 is privately informed of  2
fI; II; IIIg at the beginning of the game. Observe that for each , player 2 has a strictly
dominant strategy if given the move: types I and II play U , and type III plays D. Let
1(x) =  e 10x and the common  be 12 -12 on (1=3; 1=9; 5=9) and (1=3; 5=9; 1=9). Then the
unique strategy prole satisfying no protable one-stage deviations combined with updating
according to strong Bayesrule has 1 playing o with positive probability and then the mixture
1
2
u + 1
2
d if given the move, and 2 playing her dominant strategy. However, the unique
sequential optimum is player 1 playing i and then d if given the move, together with 2
playing her dominant strategy.
What drives this di¤erence in 1s behavior? Playing i rather than o gives player 1
exibility at the nal information set. With Bayesian updating, 1 uses this exibility to
play 1
2
u+ 1
2
d rather than d, and this is costly from the perspective of player 1 at the initial
information set. Since, for some , 1s payo¤s from o are higher than those from i followed
by 1
2
u+ 1
2
d, and the reverse is true for other , 1 is motivated to hedge against ambiguity by
mixing between o and i at the initial information set. The details may be found in Appendix
B.16 In contrast, observe that for player 1, given 2s dominant strategy, the payo¤ to playing
16There we also show that strengthening the no protable one-stage deviation criterion to a Strotzian
consistent planning requirement does not eliminate the play of o with positive probability in the example.
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Figure 3.1: Game contrasting the approaches.
The vectors give utility payo¤s for players 1 and 2, in that order, for each path.
i followed by d is, -by-, strictly higher than the payo¤ to playing o. Thus, no strategy
involving playing o with positive probability can be an ex-ante best reply to 2s optimal
strategy no matter how player 1 perceives and treats the uncertainty about . This is why
o is not part of any ex-ante equilibrium, let alone a sequential optimum.
More generally, sequential optimality always rules out the play of type-by-type (itera-
tively) strictly dominated strategies in dynamic settings while no protable one-stage devi-
ations combined with Bayesian updating does not. 
As observed in this section, an ambiguity averse player who exogenously adopts, for
example, Bayesian updating will generally have disagreement (across information sets) on
the optimal strategy, and therefore may su¤er from future exibility. In contrast, a player
who, either ex-ante or at an early information set, both recognizes updating as the generator
of these costly disagreements and is able to inuence their own future information processing
would generally be better o¤ departing from Bayesian updating in order to remove these
di¢ culties. One possible view of sequential optimality is as modelling the outcomes of
strategic interaction of such players.
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3.3 Sequential Equilibrium with Ambiguity
To dene sequential equilibrium with ambiguity (SEA), we consider a condition, smooth rule
consistency, that imposes requirements on beliefs that may have bite even at information
sets that i does not view as reachable from their immediate predecessor given .17 Our con-
dition extends Kreps and Wilson (1982)s consistency condition used for the same purpose in
dening sequential equilibrium. We extend consistency in order to accommodate ambiguity
aversion by replacing Bayesrule in their denition with the smooth rule. This replacement
is justied by Theorem 3.1, since, by that result, sequential optima are as if players are
responding to beliefs generated using smooth rule updating. Just as consistency uses limits
of Bayesian updates to deliver beliefs consistent with small trembles converging to sequen-
tially optimal strategies under ambiguity neutrality, limits of smooth rule updates deliver
this under ambiguity aversion. Recall that if we simply limited attention to Bayes rule,
then sequentially optimal strategies might fail to exist under ambiguity aversion. Smooth
rule consistency is dened as follows:
Denition 3.5 (Smooth Rule Consistency) Fix a game  . A pair (; ) consisting of
a strategy prole and interim belief system satises smooth rule consistency if there exists
a sequence of completely mixed strategy proles fkg1k=1, with limk!1 k = , such that
 = limk!1 k, where each k is the interim belief system satisfying the smooth rule using
k.
Observe that smooth rule consistency is a true extension of Kreps and Wilsons consis-
tency because Bayesrule and the smooth rule coincide under ambiguity neutrality. SEA
strengthens sequential optimality exactly by adding the requirement of smooth rule consis-
tency:
Denition 3.6 (SEA) A sequential equilibrium with ambiguity (SEA) of a game   is a pair
(; ) consisting of a strategy prole and interim belief system such that (; ) is sequentially
optimal and satises smooth rule consistency.
We may use Theorem 3.2 and that smooth rule consistency delivers a  satisfying the
strong smooth rule using  to conclude that replacing sequential optimality in the denition
of SEA by having no protable one-stage deviations would not change the set of equilibrium
strategies.
17If there are no such information sets, any sequentially optimal strategy prole is also part of an SEA
(see Theorem A.3).
24
Theorem 3.3 A pair (; ) is an SEA if and only if (; ) has no protable one-stage
deviations and satises smooth rule consistency.
An implication of this last result together with Corollary 3.1 is that SEA and sequential
equilibrium are equivalent under the assumption of ambiguity neutrality.
Running Example continued: Lets apply SEA to our running example. We show
that if peace is an ex-ante equilibrium outcome, then it is also an SEA outcome if and only
if the large countrys payo¤ x to staying neutral after a breakdown is at most 0:5. Notice
that this is strictly lower than the bound of 1 we saw when applying sequential optimality.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose there is an ex-ante equilibrium yielding peace with probability 1.
Then there exists an SEA yielding peace with probability 1 if and only if x  0:5.
The key is that smooth rule consistency forces beliefs of player 3 about which player
defected to be the same at both information sets that follow defection. This is not implied
by sequential optimality alone, and when 0:5 < x  1, attaining peace requires player 3 to
hold di¤erent beliefs across these information sets. Once these beliefs are forced to be the
same, it is not in 3s interest to play in a way such that both players 1 and 2 think there
is a chance they will be punished following defection. Therefore, at least one of the small
countries will nd it in their interest to defect.
In contrast, when x  0:5, at each of 3s information sets following defection, any mixture
over punishing 1 and punishing 2 is a best response to beliefs such that the two nodes in the
information set are unambiguously equally likely. Thus, given such beliefs, 3 is willing to
punish in a way su¢ cient to ensure peace. Such beliefs satisfying smooth rule consistency
can be generated, for example, by a completely mixed sequence of strategies converging to
always cooperating that give, along the sequence, the same probability to 1 defecting as to
2 defecting after 1 cooperates. 
We next show that every game   has at least one SEA (and thus also at least one
sequential optimum and ex-ante equilibrium). Since the functions i describing players
ambiguity attitudes are part of the description of  , this result goes beyond the observation
that an SEA would exist if players were ambiguity neutral, and ensures existence given any
specied ambiguity aversion and ex-ante beliefs. The manner in which the smooth rule
generalizes Bayes rule allows us to prove this result by adapting known techniques from
existence proofs for sequential equilibrium.
Theorem 3.4 An SEA exists for any game  .
In Appendix A (see Theorem A.2), we show that SEA implies that beliefs are uniquely
dened at all information sets according to a version of the smooth rule formula using
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limits of likelihoods. This provides a method for constructing beliefs satisfying smooth rule
consistency.
4 E¤ects of ambiguity aversion on equilibria
4.1 Comparative statics in ambiguity aversion
In this section, we explore the extent to which changes in ambiguity aversion a¤ect equi-
librium play. When we say equilibrium in this section, it will not matter whether we refer
to ex-ante equilibria, sequential optima or SEAs, as the comparative statics in ambiguity
aversion will be the same for all of these. We start with the simplest and most direct compar-
ative statics question: Holding all else xed about a game (which, recall, includes specifying
beliefs), do changes in ambiguity aversion a¤ect the set of equilibrium strategy proles (and
play paths)? The answer is yes they can, as was true in our running example. In fact, the
set of equilibria can change entirely, as the following result shows:
Theorem 4.1 For some game form, payo¤s and beliefs, the set of equilibrium strategy pro-
les under ambiguity neutrality is disjoint from that under some ambiguity aversions.
What if, as an outside observer, one is not willing to x particular beliefs when describing
the equilibrium predictions of the theory, but is willing to assume that all players share the
same belief? How do such predictions change when ambiguity aversion is introduced?
Theorem 4.2 Fix any game form and payo¤s. Taking the union, over beliefs , of the set
of equilibria generated if the common belief were , ambiguity aversion makes this union
weakly larger (in the superset sense) compared to ambiguity neutrality, and, for some games
and ambiguity aversions, this expansion is strict.
Thus, under an assumption of common beliefs, ambiguity aversion may not only generate
new equilibrium behavior (and new paths of play), but also does not eliminate equilibria
possible under ambiguity neutrality. For instance, strict expansion occurs in the running
example with su¢ cient ambiguity aversion and x  0:5.
Does dropping the restriction to common beliefs change the answer to the question in
the previous paragraph? It does, and quite dramatically so in this case, we show that the
predictions of the theory do not change with ambiguity aversion:
Theorem 4.3 Fix any game form and payo¤s. Ambiguity aversion never a¤ects the union,
over beliefs (i)i2N , of the set of equilibria generated if beliefs were (i)i2N .
26
To gain intuition for the previous two results, it is useful to rewrite the linear approxi-
mation in (2.2) as follows:
X
2()
 X
h2H
ui(h)p(0i; i)(hjh0)(h0)
!
0i
 X
h2H
ui(h)p(hjh0)(h0)
!
i() (4.1)
Equation (4.1) is a linear aggregation of the expected payo¤s for each  with weights on
the  given by the 0i term times i. We will refer to the normalized-to-one version of these
weights on the  as is e¤ective beliefs (at ), since they are the local analogue of beliefs i in
the ex-ante preferences. We see from (4.1) that the impact of changing ambiguity aversion on
equilibria comes from the e¤ect that ambiguity aversion has in generating di¤erent e¤ective
beliefs for di¤erent players. In Theorem 4.2, this is what may generate new equilibria. In
Theorem 4.3, observe that any change in e¤ective beliefs coming from changes in 0i can be
o¤set by corresponding changes in i. This o¤setting is not possible under the restriction to
a common  because the o¤setting required for each player may di¤er.
Theorem 4.3 has analogues in the literature. For a result that in individual decision
problems, under standard assumptions (including reduction, broad framing, statewise dom-
inance and expected utility evaluation of objective lotteries), all observed behavior optimal
according to ambiguity averse preferences is also optimal for some subjective expected utility
preferences, see e.g., Kuzmics (2015). Bade (2016) independently shows that without restric-
tions on beliefs, predictions using ex-ante equilibria do not change with ambiguity aversion.
Considering a type of self-conrming equilibria, Battigalli et al. (2015, p. 667) show that
the set of these equilibria does not change as ambiguity aversion changes.
Battigalli et al. (2015) have as their main nding a result (their Theorem 1 together with
an example of strict inclusion), which Battigalli et al. (2017) focuses on partially extending to
dynamic games, in which they show that the set of their self-conrming equilibria increases as
ambiguity aversion increases and that this increase can be strict. This result relies crucially
on limiting attention to pure strategies (both in terms of the equilibrium prole and in terms
of the deviations against which optimality is checked). If we were also to limit attention to
pure strategies in both these respects, an analogous result would apply to our equilibria:
Theorem 4.4 Fix any game form and payo¤s. Taking the union, over beliefs (i)i2N , of
the set of pure equilibria with respect to pure strategy deviations generated if the beliefs were
(i)i2N , increasing ambiguity aversion of one or more players weakly expands (in the superset
sense) this union. For some games and increases in ambiguity aversion, this expansion is
strict.
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4.2 Robustness
To introduce our discussion of robustness, we begin with an example. Consider a two player
one-stage game, where each player has a choice between two actions A and B. The parameter
space about which there is ambiguity is  = f1; 2g. Both players have beliefs  such that
(1) = (2) =
1
2
, where 1(1) = 23 and 2(1) =
1
2
, and do not learn anything about
 before choosing their action. They both share the same . Payo¤s as a function of the
actions and  are as follows:
1 A B
A 0; 0 1; 8
B  8; 1  6; 6
2 A B
A 6; 6 1; 16
B 16; 1 12; 12
(4.2)
Observe that given 1, A is strictly dominant for each player, while given 2, B is strictly
dominant. Under ambiguity neutrality, i.e.  a¢ ne, both (A;A) and (B;B) are equilibrium
strategy proles. We claim that (A;A) is robust to increased ambiguity aversion (i.e., remains
an equilibrium when  becomes more concave), but (B;B) is not. To see that (A;A) is
robust, note that, assuming her opponent plays A, a player evaluates the mixed strategy
A + (1   )B according to 1
2
(2) + 1
2
(4   ), which is maximized at  = 1 for any
concave . To see that (B;B) is not robust, note that for example, if (x) =  e x with
 > ln(1+
p
5
2
)  0:48, it is protable to deviate to A.
Another sense of robustness is that an equilibrium supported for a wider range of beliefs
is more robust. Consider the set of weights  on 1 and 2 that support (A;A) as an
equilibrium. Such weights are those satisfying (1)  
0(3)
20(2)+0(3) . Notice that as  becomes
more concave, 
0(3)
20(2)+0(3) decreases, approaching 0 in the limit as
0(3)
0(2) approaches 0, and
thus su¢ cient ambiguity aversion results in a large set of weights  supporting (A;A). The
fact that ambiguity aversion leads to such a large set of beliefs supporting (A;A) is not
special to this example. We show, under some conditions, that equilibria that are robust
to increased ambiguity aversion must be supported by a large set of beliefs for su¢ cient
ambiguity aversion, and furthermore, this supporting set of beliefs may be made as large as
desired (see Theorem 4.5 and Remark 4.1). We refer to this as ambiguity aversion making
an equilibrium belief robust.
One use of our robustness result is as follows: Consider a population having heterogeneous
beliefs. Equilibria that, under ambiguity neutrality, are not supported by many beliefs might
not be expected to occur often. Our result o¤ers ambiguity aversion as a possible explanation
for unexpected prevalence of such equilibria. Specically, if such an equilibrium is, like (A;A),
robust to increased ambiguity aversion, ambiguity aversion can make it an equilibrium for
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more of the population (i.e., for more beliefs).
We turn to formal denitions of these two robustness notions and our result relating
them. An equilibrium strategy prole is robust to increased ambiguity aversion if it remains
an equilibrium whenever one or more of the i becomes more concave:
Denition 4.1 For a game  , an equilibrium  is robust to increased ambiguity aversion
if it remains an equilibrium whenever, for each i, i is replaced by an at least as concave ^i.
Ambiguity aversion makes an equilibrium strategy prole  belief robust if su¢ cient
increases in playersambiguity aversion, holding the s in the supports of playersbeliefs
(i)i2N xed, make all beliefs placing su¢ cient weight on each such  support  as an
equilibrium:
Denition 4.2 For a game  , consider an equilibrium . Ambiguity aversion makes  belief
robust if, for each i and "i 2 (0; 1jsuppij), there exists 
"i
i at least as concave as i so that:
 is an equilibrium of this game with (^i)i2N and (^i)i2N whenever the (^i)i2N have the same
supports as the (i)i2N and, for each i, min2suppi ^i() > "i and ^i at least as concave as

"i
i .
The next result shows, under some conditions on how expected payo¤s vary with , the
tight connection between robustness to increased ambiguity aversion and belief robustness.
Theorem 4.5 Fix a game  . The following is true when either ex-ante equilibrium or
sequential optimality are used as the notion of equilibrium:
If an equilibrium  is robust to increased ambiguity aversion and, for each player i, the
expected payo¤
P
h2H ui(h)p(hjh0)(h0) can be strictly ordered across the  in the support
of i, then ambiguity aversion makes  belief robust.
Theorem 4.5 also holds when SEA is used as the equilibrium concept under the following
modication: In addition to SEA, require that there is a sequence of completely mixed
strategy proles fkg1k=1, such that limk!1 k = , with respect to which smooth rule
consistency simultaneously holds for any interim belief systems used to support  as an SEA
in the theorem or associated denitions.
Remark 4.1 Suppose i is twice continuously di¤erentiable with 
0
i > 0 everywhere. Then
Theorem 4.5 remains true when, in the denition of belief robust, "ii is restricted to be of
the constant absolute ambiguity aversion form, "ii (x)   e ("i)x where ("i) > 0.
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Intuition for the theorem in the case of ex-ante equilibrium is as follows: Robustness to
increased ambiguity aversion implies that i must be a best response given the minimizing ,
since, as long as there is a unique expected payo¤minimizing , one can always nd increases
in ambiguity aversion that generate e¤ective beliefs that are any interior convex combination
of the e¤ective beliefs under the original i and degenerate beliefs on the minimizing . Given
this, if one were to go to the limit (i.e., all e¤ective weight placed on the minimizing ),
then the beliefs over the  cease to matter and all beliefs with the same support make i a
best response. The proof of the theorem reveals that the arguments required along the way
toward the limit are more subtle, making use of concave transformations tailored to generate
specic shifts in e¤ective beliefs when dening threshold "ii that do the job and relaxing all
beliefs to all beliefs up to the "i constraints. As Remark 4.1 indicates, if one doesnt mind
bounds that may be much less tight, comparison to the threshold "ii may be simplied by
taking the threshold to have a constant coe¢ cient of ambiguity aversion ("i) (see Klibano¤,
Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), pp. 1865-6).
Without the assumption on expected payo¤s, the theorem would be false. The role of this
assumption is to ensure enough exibility in the manner in which more ambiguity aversion
can shift the e¤ective weight placed on expected payo¤s for the various .
In Section 5.2, we apply Theorem 4.5 in analyzing the e¤ect of the entrants ambiguity
aversion on the robustness of limit-pricing equilibria.
5 Examples
5.1 Example: Ambiguous Cheap Talk
The example is a game in which deliberately introducing ambiguity about actions without
payo¤ consequences (ambiguous cheap talk) proves valuable in equilibrium (ex-ante, se-
quentially optimal or SEA) for a principal communicating to two agents. The equilibrium
we identify would not be a solution under no protable one-stage deviations (or Strotzian
consistent planning) together with Bayesian updating. It is only under the latter approach
that existing literature (see e.g., Bose and Renou (2014), Beauchêne, Li and Li (2017), Kell-
ner and Le Quement (2018)) has been able to establish, through arguments relying in an
essential way on violations of sequential optimality, a value for ambiguous cheap talk. As
was discussed in Section 3.2.1, such approaches may lead ambiguity averse players to reject
freely available, relevant information, and thus it is not clear whether the value of ambigu-
ous communication could survive in the absence of such an e¤ect. Thus, our analysis of this
example establishes a new reason why ambiguous cheap talk can be valuable: like the ambi-
30
guity about payo¤-relevant actions in our running example, increasing the ambiguity of the
communication can enhance the ability to provide incentives to both agents simultaneously
by moving their e¤ective beliefs further apart in the desired directions.
There are three players, a principal, P , and two agents, r(ow) and c(olumn). P wishes
to induce the agents to w(ork) for him rather than start their own b(usinesses). There is
uncertainty about the value to an agent of b relative to w. P has private information about
these values. By making an informative public announcement, P hopes to improve the
chances that the agents nd w attractive. We show an ambiguous communication strategy
is optimal for P and is part of an SEA.
The parameter space has two components, a payo¤ relevant component, which can take
the value I or II, related to market-relevant characteristics of a technology, and a payo¤
irrelevant component, which can take the value U orD, related to the ndings of a laboratory
experiment. Thus the parameter space is  = fIU; ID; IIU; IIDg = fI; IIg  fU;Dg. At
stage t = 0, only P has a non-trivial move, which is to send a message  or . At t = 1,
only the agents have non-trivial moves, and each chooses b or w. P is privately informed of
 2  before sending his message. The message is publicly observed by both agents before
they choose their actions. Payo¤s are given in the following matrices, where each cell lists
the payo¤ to P , r, and c in that order:
I b w
b 0; 0; 5 0; 0; 1
w 2; 1; 5 2; 2; 2
II b w
b 0; 5; 0 0; 5; 1
w 0; 1; 0 2; 2; 2
Notice that Ps message is cheap talk. To understand the above payo¤s, begin with P . He
has an idea concerning the use of the technology and the skills and labor of the agents to
make a product. Full success of the product occurs under technology I if r works for P
(no matter what c does), but under technology II requires both agents to work for P as
both of their skills are crucial in this case. Partial success occurs under I if only c works
for P , and under technology II if either of the agents works alone for P . If neither agent
works for P , nothing is accomplished with regard to the product and no payment is made
by P . Now turn to the agents. If an agent works for P , she gets some benet, but she also
incurs an e¤ort cost that is higher than when both agents work for P (thus her payo¤ of 1
from working alone increases to 2 when working together). If an agent does not work for P ,
she starts an independent business based on her own idea for using the technology. Agent
rs business idea will be a huge success under technology II but amount to nothing under
technology I, while the reverse is true of cs business idea. Agent r is ambiguity averse with
r(x) =  e 11x. The exact specication of P and c will not be important for our analysis
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of the game.
The beliefs  for all players are 1
2
-1
2
over distributions 1 and 2 given by (where the
numbers on the top and left edges are the corresponding marginals):
3=4 1=4
1 I II
1=3 U 3=12 1=12
2=3 D 6=12 2=12
1=5 4=5
2 I II
1=4 U 1=20 4=20
3=4 D 3=20 12=20
Notice that there is ambiguity about the payo¤ relevant component of  and, xing that
component, ambiguity about the payo¤ irrelevant component of . This belief structure is,
for example, consistent with there being an underlying factor which a¤ects (the likelihood of)
both components. The factor might be some scientic principle that is not well understood,
which inuences both the functioning of the technology (I vs. II) as well as the ndings of
the laboratory experiment (U vs. D) not a¤ecting any of the playersbusiness ventures.
First consider the case where all players are ambiguity neutral. If P plays an uninforma-
tive strategy (e.g., sends the same message for all values of the parameter), then calculation
shows that both agents will respond by playing b for sure, and P would get a payo¤ of
0. However, P can do better. The following strategy prole is an ex-ante equilibrium un-
der ambiguity neutrality: P fully reveals the payo¤ relevant component of the parameter,
and the agents play their dominant strategies in response. That is: If the payo¤ relevant
component of the parameter is I, P sends message , otherwise P sends message ; after
message , r plays w and c plays b, while after message , r plays b and c plays w. Under
this strategy, P gets his maximal payo¤ of 2 when I occurs, but gets 0 when II occurs.
Why isnt there an equilibrium where P does better than this? Any possible improvement
must involve incentivizing both agents to play w with positive probability when II occurs.
However, since the only way to convince r to play w is to have her put su¢ cient weight on
I occurring while c is convinced to play w only if she puts su¢ cient weight on II occurring,
it is impossible under ambiguity neutrality for P to have it both ways.
Next reintroduce rs ambiguity aversion (r(x) =  e 11x), and consider the following
strategy prole, : If the parameter is IU , P sends message , otherwise P sends message
; after either message, r plays w; after message , c plays b, and after , c plays w. Observe
that P is making use of the payo¤ irrelevant component of the parameter. We show that
this strategy prole is an equilibrium (Proposition 5.1), and, that the principal does strictly
better than if he were not allowed to use the payo¤ irrelevant component (Proposition 5.2).
Formally:
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Proposition 5.1 The strategy prole  is an SEA. In this equilibrium, P attains his max-
imum possible payo¤ for each parameter.
Remark 5.1 The strategy prole  remains an equilibrium for any r more concave than
the one in the example.
Proposition 5.2 If P were not allowed to make his strategy depend on the payo¤ irrelevant
component of the parameter (i.e., U or D), there would be no ex-ante equilibrium yielding P
the maximum possible payo¤ for each parameter.
How does playing the ambiguous communication strategy P help P do better in the
example? It allows P to expose r to more ambiguity in equilibrium than r would be exposed
to under the optimal communication strategy that does not make use of U vs. D. To
understand this, rst note that the best strategy, ^P , for P that does not depend on U vs.
D is: if I then send message  with probability   0:267, and otherwise send message .
One can then show that the only ambiguity that is relevant to rs payo¤s under each of these
strategies is that concerning the event that the message  is sent. This event is assigned
probabilities k(I) under ^

P , and k(I)k(U) under 

P . As 1(U) >  > 2(U), there is
more ambiguity under P . This additional ambiguity about the event where  is sent helps
P provide incentives to both agents simultaneously, by moving their e¤ective beliefs further
apart in the desired directions.
Notice that the only interesting updated beliefs are those of the agents after having
observed the message  (as following  the agents know the payo¤ relevant component of
the parameter is I). By Theorem 3.1, it is su¢ cient to consider smooth rule updated beliefs.
Recall that 1 puts more weight on I than does 2. Since  performs worse for r under I
than under II, r does worse under 1 than under 2 in equilibrium. Therefore, ambiguity
aversion leads rs smooth rule updated belief to place more weight on 1 than Bayesian
updated beliefs would. This is crucial in ensuring sequential optimality of  following , as
r placing more weight on I pushes r towards playing w. For c it is the reverse, i.e., since 
performs better for c under I than II, c does better under 1 than under 2 in equilibrium,
and therefore cs smooth rule updated belief places weight on 1 that is (weakly) less than
the Bayesian updated belief. To ensure that both players coordinate on playing w after ,
di¤ering updated beliefs are crucial:18 if they shared a common updated belief, at least one
agent would deviate.
18In the context of individual decisions, such belief polarization under ambiguity is explored in Baliga,
Hanany and Klibano¤ (2013).
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Remark 5.2 If agent r becomes su¢ ciently more ambiguity averse, Proposition 5.2 no
longer holds: in addition to the equilibrium in Proposition 5.1, there will be an equilibrium
where P conditions his play only on I vs. II and also obtains his maximum possible payo¤for
each parameter. Intuitively, with enough ambiguity aversion on the part of r, the additional
ambiguity generated by conditioning on U vs. D is no longer needed.
5.2 Example: Limit Pricing under Ambiguity
In this section, we use a parametric class of games based on Milgrom and Roberts (1982)s
limit pricing entry model with the twist that the entrant has ambiguity about the incumbents
cost and is ambiguity averse. In this application, SEA renes ex-ante equilibrium and we
nd conditions under which the entrants ambiguity aversion makes limit pricing behavior
more robust compared to ambiguity neutrality.
The game is as follows: An incumbent monopolist has private information concerning
its per-unit production costs cI (which is one of cL < cM < cH). Thus the parameter space
is  = fL;M;Hg.19 In the rst stage, the incumbent chooses a quantity that, together
with inverse market demand, P (Q) = a   bQ, a; b > 0, and cI determines its rst period
prot. A potential entrant with known per-unit production costs cE observes this quantity
and decides whether or not to enter at the second stage. If no entry is chosen, in the nal
stage the incumbent remains a monopolist and again chooses a quantity while facing the
same market demand and costs as in the rst stage, and the entrant gets a payo¤ of zero.
If entry is chosen, the entrant pays a xed cost K  0, the incumbents cost is learned by
the entrant, and in the nal stage the two rms compete in a complete information Cournot
duopoly with the same market demand. To make this a nite game, suppose a nite set of
feasible quantities Q (including at least the monopoly quantities for each possible production
cost and the complete information Cournot quantities).20 Denote the entrants beliefs and
ambiguity aversion by  and  respectively. The incumbents beliefs and ambiguity aversion
play no role in our analysis.
We construct an SEA strategy prole LP where in the rst stage, incumbent types M
and L pool at the monopoly quantity for L, and type H plays the monopoly quantity for H.
Then the entrant enters after observing any quantity strictly below the monopoly quantity
for L and does not enter otherwise, and in the nal stage they play the monopoly or duopoly
quantities accordingly. These strategies involve limit pricing by incumbent typeM it raises
19The use of at least three costs is necessary to have non-trivial updating on the equilibrium path under
pure strategy limit pricing. With only two possible costs, pure limit pricing strategies involve full pooling.
20The strategies we construct remain SEA strategies no matter what nite set of feasible quantities is
assumed as long as the monopoly and Cournot quantities for each cost are included.
34
its quantity (thus lowering price) in the rst stage in order to successfully deter entry.
For later reference, we collect here conditions assumed explicitly or implicitly already
plus restrictions equivalent to all monopoly and duopoly quantities being positive:
Assumption 5.1 a; b > 0, K  0, cH > cM > cL  0, cE  0, a > cH , a + cE   2cH > 0
and a+ cL   2cE > 0.
The following proposition provides su¢ cient conditions for LP to be not only part of
an SEA, but also robust to increased ambiguity aversion and more belief robust. One way
in which SEA renes ex-ante equilibrium in this example is by requiring that the Cournot
quantities in the complete information duopoly game following entry are played (there are
ex-ante equilibria violating sequential optimality that involve the incumbent deterring all
entry by threatening to ood the market if entry occurs). The robustness results tell us
that ambiguity aversion can enlarge the circumstances under which limit pricing can be
equilibrium behavior.
What is the role of the conditions in the proposition? The rst three conditions corre-
spond to the following incentives in the game: ICH for I ensures that a type H incumbent
does not want to pool with the other types to deter entry, ICM for I ensures that a type M
incumbent does not want to separate from type L and stop deterring entry, and ICH for E
ensures that the entrant strictly wants to enter when it is sure the incumbent is type H. The
combination of the two subsequent conditions on the beliefs and the assumption of su¢ cient
ambiguity aversion of the entrant ensure that it does not want to enter after observing the
limit price (i.e., the monopoly quantity for type L).
Proposition 5.3 Under Assumption 5.1, the limit pricing strategy prole LP is part of an
SEA if
(
a+ cE   2cH
3
)2  a  cL
2
(a  a  cL
2
  cH), (ICH for I)
a  cL
2
(a  a  cL
2
  cM)  (a+ cE   2cM
3
)2, (ICM for I)
b(
a+ cH   2cE
3b
)2 > K, (ICH for E)
some  2 supp makes entry conditional on fL;Mg strictly unprotable, all  2 supp can
be ordered in the likelihood-ratio ordering, and the entrant is su¢ ciently ambiguity averse.
Moreover, under the same conditions, LP is SEA robust to increased ambiguity aversion,
and ambiguity aversion makes it SEA belief robust.
The proof uses the formula for an interim belief system  satisfying smooth rule consis-
tency provided by Theorem A.2 to establish that (LP; ) is an SEA and uses Theorem 4.5
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to establish belief robustness. It follows from the above result that for any beliefs such that
some  2 supp makes entry conditional on fL;Mg strictly unprotable and all  2 supp
can be ordered in the likelihood-ratio ordering and that lead an ambiguity neutral entrant
to want to enter even after observing the limit price, there exists a large enough increase in
the entrants ambiguity aversion such that the entrant would be deterred by the limit price.
In this way, increasing ambiguity aversion leads to expansion in the set of beliefs  that can
support such a limit pricing SEA.
6 Extensions
6.1 Other models of ambiguity averse players
We have assumed players have smooth ambiguity preferences (Klibano¤, Marinacci and
Mukerji, 2005), which proved very convenient in many respects. Can our approach be applied
to players with other kinds of ambiguity averse preferences? We suggest how to do so for any
preferences that can be represented byWi(Ui(; )2), whereWi is a continuous, monotonic
and quasi-concave aggregator (across the parameters  2 ) of the vector Ui(; )2 of is
expected utilities of . Quasi-concavity of Wi reects ambiguity aversion. This is essentially
what Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) call Uncertainty Averse preferences, and includes smooth
ambiguity preferences along with many other models from the literature, some of which are
recursive. Note that Maxmin Expected Utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) is a subclass
of Uncertainty Averse preferences, and if the set of probability measures in the Maxmin EU
representation is taken to be the (convex hull of) the support of i, then these preferences
can be interpreted as a model of an innitely ambiguity averse player with beliefs given by
the support of i.
By modifying our framework to specify Wi rather than i and i, the denition of ex-
ante preferences and equilibrium are easily adapted. However, since such preferences do not
necessarily have separately specied beliefs and ambiguity aversion, the notion of interim
belief system would need to be replaced by an interim preference system (i.e., an interim
preference for each player and information set). Given that change, sequential optimality
could be dened. Based on our proof of Theorem 3.1, we conjecture the following would be
true:  is sequentially optimal if and only if there exists an interim preference system derived
by updating preferences so that the local measure in some local linear approximation of the
updated preferences at  is the Bayesian update of the local measure in some local linear
approximation of the preferences from the previous information set at  with respect to which
 is sequentially optimal. An analogously modied version of Theorem 3.2 is conjectured to
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hold as well. Observe that there are two key di¤erences from our current results: rst, the
reference to some local linear approximation is needed to reect the possibility of non-smooth
preferences, and, second and more importantly, only updating of local approximations is
specied in the new result, and not updating of beliefs themselves or even of the preference
representation as a whole. Specifying an update rule for the preferences themselves requires
more structure. While smooth rule updating of beliefs generates such updating for smooth
ambiguity preferences, updates generating the local approximations property for, among
others, Maxmin EU and Variational preferences (Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini,
2006) are described in Hanany and Klibano¤ (2007, 2009). In dening SEA, replacement of
smooth rule consistency with a consistency condition based on preference updates satisfying
a similar local approximations updating property would be needed.
Providing results and examples involving comparative statics in ambiguity aversion and
robustness to increased ambiguity aversion and belief robustness would, even to pose the
relevant questions properly, require some kind of separate specication and manipulation
of ambiguity aversion and of beliefs. Here the smooth ambiguity model, with ambiguity
aversion (via i) and beliefs (via i) separately and conveniently specied, was especially
helpful. We conjecture that if one had some other class of Uncertainty Averse preferences
where these components could be sensibly specied then one could investigate these issues.
6.2 Implementation of mixed actions
Players choose behavior strategies, which, for each type of the player, specify a mixture over
the available actions at each information set. Suppose at some point a players strategy spec-
ies a non-degenerate mixture, and, as can happen under ambiguity aversion, this strategy
is strictly better than any specifying a pure action. If such a mixture is to be implemented
by means of playing pure actions contingent on the outcome of a (possibly existing in the
players mind only) randomization device, then an additional sequential optimality concern
beyond that formally reected in Denition 3.2 may be relevant. Specically, after the real-
ization of the randomization device is observed, will it be optimal for the player to play the
corresponding pure action? A way to ensure this is true is to consider behavior strategies
that, instead of specifying mixed actions, specify pure actions contingent on randomization
devices, and extend the specication of beliefs and preferences of a player to include points
after realization of her randomization device but before she has taken action contingent on
the device, and add to Denition 3.2 the requirement of optimality also at these points. The
properties of sequential optimality shown and used in this paper would remain true under
these modications.
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6.3 Other extensions
We briey discuss a nal pair of possible extensions. First, in the running example, there
is only one payo¤ irrelevant component of the parameter. Suppose one wanted to allow the
players to condition on any payo¤ irrelevant ambiguity they wish. This may be (approxi-
mately) achieved by enriching the parameter space to include many such components, and
specify  so that these reect a rich (but nite) collection of ambiguous devices. Such enrich-
ment would allow, for instance, explicitly modeling the large country in the running example
as choosing to condition on a payo¤ irrelevant component having the optimalambiguity
about it. Furthermore, our point that the large country will strictly want to condition its
play on some such ambiguous component is robust to any enrichment of this form. The same
applies to the ambiguous cheap talk example.
Second, as written, our theory does not allow a player to be uncertain about the ambiguity
aversion, i.e. i, of other players. This might be done as follows: Introduce a i-type
component of the parameter space that i is allowed to depend on, and assume that the
rst thing that happens in the game is that each player learns their own i-type. The point
immediately after this occurs would be treated as the ex-ante stage of the game, and the
analysis would then proceed exactly as in the paper.
7 Closely related literature
To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to propose an equilibrium notion for dynamic
games with incomplete information that requires sequential optimality while allowing for
ambiguity averse preferences. In this section we relate our approach to the few papers which
investigate general dynamic games with incomplete information and ambiguity aversion.21
There have been only a very few papers investigating general dynamic games with incom-
plete information and ambiguity aversion. The two most closely related to ours are Battigalli
et al. (2017) and Pahlke (2018). Battigalli et al. (2017) explores a notion of self-conrming
equilibrium in dynamic games where players are ambiguity averse with smooth ambiguity
preferences (building on Battigalli et al. (2015), which did the same for games in strategic
form, and so took a purely ex-ante perspective). There are a number of key di¤erences
21In addition to the papers we mention when discussing ex-ante equilibrium in Section 3.1, a number of
previous papers have analyzed incomplete information games with ambiguity sensitive preferences in settings
without dynamics, including Salo and Weber (1995), Levin and Ozdenoren (2004), Bose, Ozdenoren and Pape
(2006), Chen, Katuscak and Ozdenoren (2007), Lopomo, Rigotti and Shannon (2010), Bodoh-Creed (2012),
Wolitzky (2013, 2016), Ayouni and Koessler (2017), di Tillio, Kos and Messner (2017) and Auster (2018).
Additional papers on dynamic games with ambiguity not discussed here include Eichberger and Kelsey (1999,
2004), Dominiak and Lee (2017), Muraviev, Riedel and Sass (2017) and Eichberger, Grant and Kelsey (2018).
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from our approach. First, by building on self-conrming equilibrium they are able to tightly
link their solution concept to steady-state learning. In contrast, the Nash-like and stronger
equilibrium notions we build on are not as linked to learning foundations. While the In-
troduction o¤ered some thoughts about how restrictions on learning opportunities might
relate to our equilibria, whether and how such ideas can be formalized and their lessons
for the equilibrium concepts we explore is left for future research. Second, self-conrming
equilibrium places essentially no restriction on o¤-path beliefs or behavior and so is not
designed to address strategic concerns such as perfection and credibility of o¤-path threats
that are central to our analysis. Third, they limit attention to Bayesian updating of beliefs
i, leading to violations of sequential optimality even at on-path information sets. Instead of
sequential optimality, they require unimprovabilitywhich can be thought of as roughly no
protable one-stage deviations at on-path information sets.22 Fourth, they assume players
choose only pure actions at each information set, with any randomization being modeled by
explicitly included moves of an articial separate player who is assumed to randomize over
actions using commonly known probabilities. A practical consequence of this is that their no
protable one-stage deviations requirement is generally strictly more permissive under am-
biguity aversion than ours at a given information set because they are only checking against
a (at most) nite selection of mixed actions (which, recall, under ambiguity aversion may be
strictly better than any pure action). Though mixed strategy proles appear in their den-
ition of equilibrium, those are mixtures only in the population sense of distributions over a
population of players in the same role who may have some heterogeneity in the pure strategy
they play. The main result of Battigalli et al. (2015) was a comparative static: the set of
self-conrming equilibria was shown to expand as players became more ambiguity averse. A
main focus in Battigalli et al. (2017) is investigating the extent to which this result carries
over to dynamic games. They nd it does not carry over in general due to possible on-path
dynamic inconsistency, but does extend under conditions where this is not an issue (see their
Section 6). This nding complements our Theorem 4.4 showing that, when similarly limiting
attention to pure strategies and pure-strategy deviations, the sets of ex-ante, sequentially
optimal and SEA proles expand as players become more ambiguity averse (see Section 4.1
and Appendix A.4.2). As Battigalli et al. (2015) showed for self-conrming equilibria, this
expansion depends crucially on the restriction on mixed strategies and becomes equality once
the full set of mixtures is considered (our Theorem 4.3).
Subsequent to our paper, Pahlke (2018) explores a notion of sequential equilibrium in
22In an extension, they explore a rationalizable version of their self-conrming equilibrium, where ratio-
nality is dened in terms of unimprovability at all information sets. This yields some restrictions on o¤-path
behavior.
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dynamic games where players are ambiguity averse with Recursive Maxmin Expected Util-
ity preferences (preferences shown by Epstein and Schneider (2003a) to be equivalent to
Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) preferences (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) together with
prior-by-prior Bayesian updating, where the set of priors satises a condition known as
rectangularity). In Pahlkes denition of a game, a notable non-standard aspect is that
the specic preferences, even ex-ante, are not a primitive. Rather, these ex-ante prefer-
ences for each player i are derived according to a procedure that generates a rectangular set
i   () for each player depending on the (other playerspart of the) strategy prole 
under consideration, a set P   () which is a primitive of the game, and the ltration
dened by player is information sets. That the i may vary across players is important
in ensuring existence of Pahlkes equilibria when the i are non-singleton, i.e., when there
is non-trivial ambiguity. This heterogeneity explains how Pahlkes approach overcomes the
specialization of the results of Ellis (2018) to MEU preferences, which imply that when 
consists of privately known types for each player and there is a common rectangular set of
priors across players, ex-ante preferences must be ambiguity neutral.23 We make four ob-
servations comparing Pahlke (2018) to our framework and approach when adapted to MEU
preferences (see Section 6.1). Fix a game form and payo¤s. First, for each (P ; ), Pahlkes
analysis of whether  is an equilibrium corresponds to checking whether it is so according
to our approach in the game in which each player i has ex-ante MEU preferences with set
of priors i. Second, as generally i 6= P, equilibria Pahlke identies for a given P will
di¤er from the ones we would identify for that P. Third, since the i vary with , Pahlkes
determination of the set of equilibria given a particular P involves potentially analyzing a
di¤erent game in our framework for each candidate . Fourth, since each generated i must
be rectangular, the strategy proles that are an equilibrium for at least one P according to
Pahlke form a subset of those that are an equilibrium according to our approach for at least
one assignment of sets of priors to each player i.
The literature also includes papers presenting analysis restricted to specic applications
of dynamic games of incomplete information with ambiguity. These include Bose and Daripa
(2009), Bose and Renou (2014), Kellner and Le Quement (2017, 2018), Beauchêne, Li and
Li (2017), Auster and Kellner (2018), and all focus on behavior that cannot occur under
ambiguity neutrality. Their approach is to assume MEU preferences and prior-by-prior
Bayesian updating and use as an equilibrium concept optimality under consistent planning
23Grant, Meneghel and Tourky (2016, Section 5) also provide an example illustrating that in Bayesian
games with recursive strictly ambiguity averse preferences, when the commonality condition in Ellis (2018) is
relaxed, an ex-ante equilibrium may exist. We observe that the combination of no o¤-path information sets
in Bayesian games and such recursion ensure that any ex-ante equilibrium will also be a sequential optimum
with respect to the interim preferences aggregated in the recursion.
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in the spirit of Strotz (1955-56) (see Appendix B for a denition). Thus, as was discussed
and illustrated in Section 3.2, the set of equilibria identied by this approach include strategy
proles that are not sequentially optimal, and exclude some or all of the sequentially optimal
strategy proles. In fact, all of the behavior they emphasize violates sequential optimality.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proofs related to the running example
Proof of Proposition 3.1. To prove (i), suppose 1 and 2 are a¢ ne. Fix any  such that
peace (i.e., 1 and 2 play c) occurs with positive probability. We will show that at least one
player has a protable deviation. Denoting the total probability (
P
2() ()()3()(a))
that player 3 assigns to each action a by (a), player 1 and 2s ex-ante preferences are,
respectively, given by:
V1() = 1(c)2(c)(4(f2) + 5(f1)) + (1  1(c)2(c)) (6(n) + 10(p2)) ;
and
V2() = 1(c)2(c)(5(f2) + 4(f1)) + (1  1(c)2(c))(6(n) + 10(1  (n)  (p2))).
If it is not protable to deviate to 1(c) = 0 for player 1, then
6(n) + 10(p2)  4(f2) + 5(1  (f2)) = 5  (f2),
while if it is not protable to deviate 2(c) = 0 for player 2, then
4(n) + 10(p2)   5(f2)  4(1  (f2)) + 10 = 6  (f2),
a contradiction. Thus at least one player wants to deviate to playing d. Observe that this
argument holds for any common  not just the one specied in the example.
Turning to (ii), x a strategy prole  dened by 1(c) = 2(c) = 1 and 3(I)(p1) =
3(II)(p2) = 3(I)(f2) = 3(II)(f1) = 1. First, observe that any strategy by player 3 is an
ex-ante best response, since on the equilibrium path 3 receives a payo¤ of 4 no matter what
strategy 3 plays. Second, player i 2 f1; 2g, when choosing the probability i with which to
play c, is ex-ante best responding if and only if
1 2 arg max
i2[0;1]
1
2
i (4i) +
1
2
i (5i + 10(1  i)) .
This is equivalent to
40i (4)  50i (5)  0
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which is
0i (4)
0i (5)
 5
4
. (A.1)
Observe that by increasing the concavity of i one can increase
0i(4)
0i(5)
as much as desired.
Suppose one player is su¢ ciently ambiguity averse that (A.1) is satised, but the other is
not. When is there an ex-ante equilibrium yielding peace with probability 1? It is necessary
to consider more general strategies of player 3 than specied above. Again let  denote the
strategy prole and again require 1(c) = 2(c) = 1. We leave player 3s strategy exible.
Player 1 is ex-ante best responding if and only if
1 2 arg max
12[0;1]
1
2
1
 
(43(I)(f2) + 5(1  3(I)(f2))1
+(103(I)(p2) + 63(I)(n))(1  1)
!
+
1
2
1
 
(43(II)(f2) + 5(1  3(II)(f2))1
+(103(II)(p2) + 63(II)(n))(1  1)
!
.
This is equivalent to
(43(I)(f2) + 5(1  3(I)(f2))  103(I)(p2)  63(I)(n))
01 (43(I)(f2) + 5(1  3(I)(f2)))
+(43(II)(f2) + 5(1  3(II)(f2))  103(II)(p2)  63(II)(n))
01 (43(II)(f2) + 5(1  3(II)(f2)))
 0. (A.2)
Player 2 is ex-ante best responding if and only if
1 2 arg max
22[0;1]
1
2
2
 
(53(I)(f2) + 4(1  3(I)(f2))2
+(10(1  3(I)(n)  3(I)(p2)) + 63(I)(n))(1  2)
!
+
1
2
2
 
(53(II)(f2) + 4(1  3(II)(f2))2
+(10(1  3(II)(n)  3(II)(p2)) + 63(II)(n))(1  2)
!
.
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This is equivalent to
(53(I)(f2) + 4(1  3(I)(f2))  10(1  3(I)(n)  3(I)(p2))  63(I)(n))
02 (53(I)(f2) + 4(1  3(I)(f2)))
+(53(II)(f2) + 4(1  3(II)(f2))  10(1  3(II)(n)  3(II)(p2))  63(II)(n))
02 (53(II)(f2) + 4(1  3(II)(f2)))
 0. (A.3)
Suppose, for example, that player 2 is not ambiguity averse enough to satisfy (A.1). If we
set 3(II)(p2) = 3(I)(f2) = 3(II)(f1) = 1 and 3(I)(p2) = 1 3(I)(p1), then (A.2) and
(A.3) become
(4  103(I)(p2))01 (4)  501 (5)  0
and
(5  10(1  3(I)(p2)))02 (5) + 402 (4)  0.
If we set 3(I)(p2) = 0:1, then even an ambiguity neutral player 2 will have c as a best
response. As long as player 1 has
01 (4)
01 (5)
 5
3
then this is an ex-ante equilibrium.
Similarly, if player 2 has
02 (4)
02 (5)
 5
3
then setting 3(I)(p1) = 3(I)(f2) = 3(II)(f1) = 1 and 3(II)(p2) = 0:9 gives an ex-ante
equilibrium without conditions on 1s ambiguity aversion.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Suppose x > 1. Following the play of d by either 1 or 2,
the only best response to any updated belief of player 3 is to play n with probability 1 as
this yields 3 a payo¤ of x > 1 > 0. Thus 3(I; d)(n) = 3(II; d)(n) = 1 in any sequential
optimum. Given that, both players 1 and 2 expect to get a payo¤ of 6 if they deviate to d,
which is higher than any payo¤ to playing c (i.e., 4 or 5).
Suppose x  0:5 and x an ex-ante equilibrium  yielding peace with probability
1. We will construct a sequential optimum (^; ) yielding peace with probability 1. Set
^3(I; d)(p1) = 3(I; d)(p1)+
3(I;d)(n)
2
, ^3(I; d)(p2) = 3(I; d)(p2)+
3(I;d)(n)
2
, and ^3(I; d)(n) =
0, and use the analogous construction to determine ^3(II; d). At all other information sets,
let ^ = . Observe that ^ yields peace with probability 1. We next verify that ^ is an ex-ante
equilibrium. Player 3 is trivially ex-ante best responding, so it su¢ ces to show that 1 and
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2 are as well. Since 10
2
< 6, for both parameters I and II, player 1 and 2s expected payo¤
to deviating towards d is less under ^3 than under 3. Therefore c remains an ex-ante best
response for both players and ^ is an ex-ante equilibrium. It remains to specify beliefs and
check optimality for all players at all information sets. Given beliefs satisfying the strong
smooth rule using ^, by Theorem 3.2, it is su¢ cient to check optimality against one-stage
deviations, and therefore only at information sets where the player has a non-trivial move.
Begin with player 3. Following the play of c; c, 3 is indi¤erent among any mixture over f1
and f2 and is thus best responding. Following the breakdown of negotiations, observe that
at either of player 3s two non-singleton information sets the strong smooth rule does not
restrict 3s beliefs, and any mixture over actions p1 and p2 is a best response to some beliefs.
Let 3s respective beliefs at these information sets be such that ^3(I; d) and ^3(II; d) are,
respectively, best responses. Next, specify beliefs for players 1 and 2 that place probability
1
2
on each of the two degenerate  on the corresponding information set. Since these beliefs
maintain the ex-ante -weights and there is no change in payo¤s compared to the ex-ante
evaluations, these beliefs satisfy the strong smooth rule using ^ and playing c is a best re-
sponse for 1 and 2 at the information sets where they move because it was an ex-ante best
response.
Suppose 0:5 < x  1. Then no non-degenerate mixture over p1 and p2 can be a best
response at either of player 3s non-singleton information sets because it would be dominated
by replacing one of them in the mixture by n. If players 1 and 2 are both su¢ ciently ambiguity
averse so that (A.1) is satised, the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 3.1 shows that there is an
ex-ante equilibrium yielding peace with probability 1 in which player 3 uses only degenerate
mixtures of p1 and p2. The arguments in the x  0:5 case applied to this ex-ante equilibrium
show that it is also sequentially optimal.
Proof of Remark 3.1. Observe that under 0:5 < x  1, player 3 is limited to mixtures
of p1 and n or p2 and n in order to be best responding. Inequalities (A.2) and (A.3) are
necessary for players 1 and 2 to be best responding. We now show that, under (A.3), the
maximal value of the left-hand side of (A.2) is negative, contradicting (A.2). Since the payo¤s
do not depend on the parameter (I or II), we may assume without loss of generality that
3(I)(f2)  3(II)(f2). Fixing 3(I)(f2) and 3(II)(f2), since the coe¢ cients of 3(I)(n),
3(I)(p2), 3(II)(n) and 3(II)(p2) are negative in (A.2) and positive in (A.3), the maximal
value of the left-hand side of (A.2) is obtained when (A.3) is binding. This equality under
ambiguity neutrality of player 2 is equivalent to
3(II)(p2) =
12  3(I)(f2)  3(II)(f2)  43(I)(n)  103(I)(p2)  43(II)(n)
10
.
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Substituting using this and 1 (x) =  e x ln(5=3), the left-hand side of (A.2) becomes (up to
multiplication by a positive constant)
(5  3(I)(f2))(3
5
)5 3(I)(f2) + ( 7 + 3(I)(f2))(3
5
)5 3(II)(f2)
 3(I)(n)[6(3
5
)5 3(I)(f2)   4(3
5
)5 3(II)(f2)]
 3(I)(p2)[10(3
5
)5 3(I)(f2)   10(3
5
)5 3(II)(f2)]  23(II)(n)(3
5
)5 3(II)(f2).
To maximize this expression, which is linear in 3(I)(n), 3(I)(p2) and 3(II)(n) with
negative coe¢ cients, the three variables must be as low as possible. Therefore 3(II)(n) = 0
and 3(II)(p2) = 1, implying 3(I)(n) = 12   3(I)(f2)+3(II)(f2)+103(I)(p2)4 and 3(I)(p1) =
1
2
+ 3(I)(f2)+3(II)(f2)+63(I)(p2)
4
. Since 3(I)(p2) > 0 implies 3(I)(p1) > 0, the restriction
to mixtures of p1 and n or p2 and n implies 3(I)(p2) = 0. Simplifying using these values
yields
4 + 3(I)(f2) + 33(II)(f2)
2
(
3
5
)5 3(I)(f2)   (5 + 3(II)(f2))(3
5
)5 3(II)(f2)].
This expression is increasing in 3(I)(f2), and under 3(I)(f2) = 1, is decreasing in 3(II)(f2),
thus it is maximized when 3(I)(f2) = 1 and 3(II)(f2) = 0 at the value of   811250 . Therefore
(A.2) and (A.3) cannot be simultaneously satised.
The x  0:5 statement follows from the proof of Proposition 3.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Fix an ex-ante equilibrium  yielding peace with prob-
ability 1. Suppose x > 0:5, and that an SEA yielding peace with probability 1 exists.
Theorem A.2 implies that formula (A.12) is necessary for smooth rule consistency. For
player 3, since any  yielding peace with probability 1 has p i; i(I; djI) = p i; i(II; djII)
and p i; i(I; c; djI) = p i; i(II; c; djII) irrespective of the sequence k of completely mixed
strategy proles chosen to converge to , formula (A.12) implies that beliefs are the same
at both information sets where 3 has a non-trivial move. Furthermore, x > 0:5 implies that
given such beliefs, either all of 3s best responses never involve p1 or all of them never involve
p2. In the former case, player 1 will play d with probability 1, and in the latter case, player
2 will play d with probability 1. This contradicts the existence of such an SEA.
Suppose x  0:5. We will construct an SEA (^; ) yielding peace with probability 1.
Construct ^ as in the part of the proof of Proposition 3.2 that assumes x  0:5. By the
argument there, ^ is an ex-ante equilibrium. It remains to specify an interim belief system
satisfying smooth rule consistency and check optimality for all players and information sets.
Consider any sequence ^k of completely mixed strategies converging to ^ such that, for
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players 1 and 2, ^k1(c) = 1   1k+1 , ^k1(d) = 1k+1 and ^k2(c) = 1   1k+1 , ^k2(d) = 1k+1 . By
Lemma A.4 and Theorem A.2, formula (A.12) identies an interim belief system ^ satisfying
smooth rule consistency. By Theorem 3.3, for optimality, it is su¢ cient to check against
one-stage deviations, and therefore only at information sets where the player has a non-
trivial move. Begin with player 3. Following the play of c; c, 3 is indi¤erent among any
mixture over f1 and f2 and is thus best responding. O¤ the equilibrium path, observe that
at either of player 3s two information sets where 3 has a non-trivial move, since x  0:5, any
mixture over actions p1 and p2 is a best response to beliefs placing all weight on a half-half
measure over the two elements of the information set. At either of these information sets,
since p i; i(h
tjh0) = limk!1
1
k+1
1
k+1
+ k
(k+1)2
= 1
2
, ^3;Ii is degenerate on a half-half measure over
the two elements of the information set. Therefore ^3(I; d) and ^3(II; d) are, respectively,
best responses given ^3;Ii at those information sets. Next turn to players 1 and 2. Since
no uncertainty resolves for either player before they make their respective non-trivial move,
their beliefs ^i;Ii place probability
1
2
on each of the two degenerate  on the corresponding
information set, where the 1
2
is inherited from . Therefore playing c is a best response given
^i;Ii at those information sets for 1 and 2 because it was an ex-ante best response.
A.2 Proofs of results in Section 3.2
We next state and prove a key lemma on the preservation of optimality under smooth rule
updating:
Denition A.1 (Reachability) Player i views information set Ii *  as reachable from
information set I 1i given  and  if
P
hs(Ii)2Ii
P
^2(I 1i )
p(h
s(Ii)jhs(Ii) 1)^(hs(Ii) 1)i;I 1i (^) > 0.
Lemma A.1 Fix a game  , a (; ) such that  is an ex-ante equilibrium, a player i and
an information set Ii such that either Ii   or i views Ii as reachable from I 1i given  and
. If i;Ii is derived from i;I 1i (or, if Ii  , from i) via the smooth rule using  and, for
all 0i 2 i,
Vi;I 1i ()  Vi;I 1i (
0
i;  i),
(or, if Ii  , given ex-ante optimality), then, for all 0i 2 i,
Vi;Ii()  Vi;Ii(0i;  i).
Proof of Lemma A.1. The inequalities Vi;Ii()  Vi;Ii(0i;  i) (respectively, Vi() 
Vi(
0
i;  i)) for all 
0
i are equivalent to the condition that 
0
i = i maximizes (2.5) (respec-
tively, 0i = i maximizes (2.2)).
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We want to show that Vi;Ii()  Vi;Ii(0i;  i) for all 0i. By the above, it is su¢ cient to
show that 0i = i maximizes (2.5).
Let t = s(Ii). Consider the case where t > 0 (the case where t = 0 is similar, using
(2.2) instead of (A.4), and is omitted). By assumption in the statement of the lemma,
Vi;I 1i ()  Vi;I 1i (0i;  i) for all 0i 2 i. As in (2.5), this is equivalent to the condition that
0i = i maximizes X
hjht 12I 1i
ui(h)pi;0i(hjht 1)q(;);i;I
 1
i (h). (A.4)
Notice that, since is strategy is a function only of is information sets and, by perfect recall,
Ri(h
t) = Ri(Ii) for any h such that ht 2 Ii, pi;0i(htjht 1) is the same for any such h. Thus,
the objective function in (A.4) can be equivalently written asX
hjht 12I 1i
and ht =2Ii
ui(h)pi;0i(hjht 1)q(;);i;I
 1
i (h)
+pi;0i(
htjht 1)
X
hjht2Ii
ui(h)pi;0i(hjht)q(;);i;I
 1
i (h)
for any h such that ht 2 Ii. The advantage of doing so is making clear that only the termX
hjht2Ii
ui(h)pi;0i(hjht)q(;);i;I
 1
i (h) (A.5)
is a¤ected by the specication of 0i from Ii onward and no other part of 
0
i a¤ects (A.5).
Therefore, since reachability implies pi;0i(
htjht 1) > 0, i maximizes (A.4) implies that
i maximizes (A.5). For that to imply i maximizes (2.5), it is su¢ cient to show that
q(;);i;Ii(h) / q(;);i;I 1i (h) holds for fh j ht 2 Iig. This proportionality may be shown by
using the local measure denition (2.6), applying the smooth rule to substitute for i;Ii()
for all  2 (Ii) and then using the expression for ^Ii and cancelling terms.
Theorem A.1 Fix a game  . Suppose  is an ex-ante equilibrium and, for each player
i and each information set Ii * ,
P
hs(Ii)2Ii
p(h
s(Ii)jhs(Ii) 1) > 0. Then,  is sequentially
optimal.
Proof of Theorem A.1. By ex-ante optimality of , (3.1) in the denition of sequential
optimality is satised. Since
P
hs(Ii)2Ii
p(h
s(Ii)jhs(Ii) 1) > 0 for all Ii * , recursive substitution
in the smooth rule formula using  starting from Ii   implies that i views Ii as reachable
from I 1i given  and any  satisfying the smooth rule using . Therefore, by Lemma A.1,
(3.2) in the denition of sequential optimality is satised for all i and Ii.
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Proof of Theorem 3.1. The if direction follows by denition. We show the only if
direction. Suppose (; ) is sequentially optimal. We show that (; ^), where, for all i, Ii, if
Ii   or if i views Ii as reachable from I 1i given  and , ^i;Ii is derived via the smooth
rule, and ^i;Ii = i;Ii everywhere else, is sequentially optimal. By construction, ^ satises
the smooth rule using  except, possibly, for Ii not viewed as reachable from I 1i given 
and . However, from the denition of the smooth rule (Denition 3.3), observe that it is
exactly in such cases where the smooth rule allows any updated beliefs. Thus ^ satises the
smooth rule using . Since ^ does not enter into the ex-ante function Vi, the fact that (; )
is sequentially optimal directly implies that Vi()  Vi(0i;  i) for all 0i 2 i. To see that
(; ^) satises the optimality conditions Vi;Ii()  Vi;Ii(0i;  i) for all 0i 2 i, observe that
(a) where ^i;Ii = i;Ii , it directly inherits this from (; ) and (b) everywhere else, Lemma
A.1 shows that smooth rule updating ensures the required optimality.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The only if direction follows by denition. For the if direction,
suppose  is an interim belief system satisfying the strong smooth rule using  such that
(; ) has no protable one-stage deviations. First, for each player i, observe that having
no protable one-stage deviations implies optimality of i according to Vi;Ii for all Ii 2 ITi .
Proceed by induction on the stage t. Fix any t such that 0 < t  T , and suppose that, for
each player i, i is optimal according to Vi;Ii for all Ii 2 Iti . We claim that, for each player
i, i is optimal according to Vi;Ii for all Ii 2 It 1i . The argument for this is as follows. Fix a
player i and Ii 2 It 1i . Consider any strategy 0i for player i. For any Ji 2 Iti , the optimality
of i according to Vi;Ji implies (see (2.5))X
hjht2Ji
ui(h)pi;i(hjht)q(;);i;Ji(h) (A.6)

X
hjht2Ji
ui(h)pi;0i(hjht)q(;);i;Ji(h).
Since  satises strong smooth rule updating using , for all such Ji for which Ii = J 1i andP
ht2Ji
P
^2(Ii)
p i; i(h
tjht 1)^(ht 1)i;Ii(^) > 0, q(;);i;Ji(h) / q(;);i;Ii(h) holds for fh j ht 2
Jig. This proportionality follows from using the local measure denition (2.6), applying the
strong smooth rule iteratively to substitute for i;Ii and simplifying. After substituting in
(A.6) for q(;);i;Ji , cancelling the constant of proportionality and multiplying by pi;0i(h
tjht 1),
which is constant for any h such that ht 2 Ji because is strategy is a function only of is
information sets and, due to perfect recall, Ri(ht) = Ri(Ji) for any h such that ht 2 Ji, (A.6)
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becomes X
hjht2Ji
ui(h)pi;0i(h
tjht 1)pi;i(hjht)q(;);i;Ii(h) (A.7)

X
hjht2Ji
ui(h)pi;0i(h
tjht 1)pi;0i(hjht)q(;);i;Ii(h)
=
X
hjht2Ji
ui(h)pi;0i(hjht 1)q(;);i;Ii(h).
If Ii = J 1i but
P
ht2Ji
P
^2(Ii)
p i; i(h
tjht 1)^(ht 1)i;Ii(^) = 0, then q(;);i;Ii(h) = 0 for all h
with ht 2 Ji. Thus, summing (A.7) for all Ji 2 Iti for which Ii = J 1i andP
ht2Ji
P
^2(Ii)
p i; i(h
tjht 1)^(ht 1)i;Ii(^) > 0 is the same as summing for all Ji 2 Iti such
that J 1i = Ii, yielding: X
hjht 12Ii
ui(h)pi;0i(h
tjht 1)pi;i(hjht)q(;);i;Ii(h) (A.8)

X
hjht 12Ii
ui(h)pi;0i(hjht 1)q(;);i;Ii(h).
The absence of protable one-stage deviations implies i is optimal according to Vi;Ii among
all strategies deviating only at Ii. By (A.6) applied to Ii and restricted to such deviations,X
hjht 12Ii
ui(h)pi;i(hjht 1)q(;);i;Ii(h) (A.9)

X
hjht 12Ii
ui(h)pi;0i(h
tjht 1)pi;i(hjht)q(;);i;Ii(h).
Combining (A.9) and (A.8) impliesX
hjht 12Ii
ui(h)pi;i(hjht 1)q(;);i;Ii(h) (A.10)

X
hjht 12Ii
ui(h)pi;0i(hjht 1)q(;);i;Ii(h).
Since (A.10) holds for any 0i, it is the same as (A.6) with t   1 in the role of t and Ii in
the role of Ji. Therefore i is optimal according to Vi;Ii . Since this conclusion holds for
any Ii 2 It 1i , the induction step is completed. It follows that (; ) satises the optimality
conditions (3.2) in the denition of sequentially optimal.
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It remains to show that  also satises the ex-ante optimality conditions (3.1). Since
 satises smooth rule updating using , for all Ii  , q(;);i;Ii(h) / q(;i);i(h) holds for
fh j h0 2 Iig. Using this to substitute for q(;);i;Ii in (A.10) with t = 1, cancelling the
constant of proportionality and summing for all Ii, yields:X
h
ui(h)pi;i(hjh0)q(;i);i(h) (A.11)

X
h
ui(h)pi;0i(hjh0)q(;i);i(h).
Since (A.11) holds for any 0i,  maximizes (2.2) which is equivalent to the ex-ante optimality
condition (3.1).
Proof of Corollary 3.1. Assume ambiguity neutrality. From Theorem 3.1 and the fact
that under ambiguity neutrality the smooth rule specializes to Bayesrule,  is sequentially
optimal if and only if there exists an interim belief system ^ satisfying Bayesrule such that
(; ^) is sequentially optimal. Sequential optimality is sequential rationality plus ex-ante
equilibrium, immediately implying the only if direction of the corollary. To show the if
direction, repeat the argument in the last paragraph of the proof of Theorem 3.2 showing
that, for each i, optimality of i at all Ii   using smooth rule updated beliefs implies
ex-ante optimality of i.
A.3 Proofs of results in Section 3.3
Lemma A.2 If (; ) satises smooth rule consistency, then  satises the strong smooth
rule using .
Proof of Lemma A.2. By denition of smooth rule consistency, there exists a
sequence of completely mixed strategy proles fkg1k=1, with limk!1 k = , such that
 = limk!1 k, where each k is the interim belief system satisfying the smooth rule using
k. Since
P
hs(Ii)2Ii
pk(h
s(Ii)jhs(Ii) 1) > 0 for all Ii * , recursive substitution in the smooth
rule formula using k starting from Ii   implies that, for any k, i views Ii as reachable
from I 1i given 
k and k and so the formulas (3.3) and (3.4) hold for all Ii. For any player
i and Ii, if either Ii   or
P
ht2Ii
P
^2(I 1i )
p i; i(h
tjht 1)^(ht 1)i;I 1i (^) > 0, then, by con-
tinuity in the strategy prole of the formulas (3.3) and (3.4),  satises the strong smooth
rule using  at such information sets. Finally, notice that at all remaining information sets,
 trivially satises the strong smooth rule given  since this rule does not restrict beliefs
there.
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Proof of Theorem 3.3. One direction is by denition. For the other direction it is
enough to show that if (; ) has no protable one-stage deviations and satises smooth rule
consistency then (; ) is sequentially optimal. This follows directly from Lemma A.2 and
Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Fix a sequence "k = ("kI )I2[i2NIi of strictly positive vectors
of dimension j[i2NIij, converging in the sup-norm to 0 and such that "kIi  1jAi(Ii)j for all
players i and information sets Ii. For any k, let  k be the restriction of the game   dened
such that the set of feasible strategy proles is the set of all completely mixed k satisfying
ki (Ii) (ai)  "kIi for all i, Ii and actions ai 2 Ai(Ii). Consider the agent normal form Gk of
the game  k (see e.g., Myerson, 1991, p.61). Since the payo¤ functions are concave and the
set of strategies of each player in Gk is non-empty, compact and convex, Gk has an ex-ante
equilibrium by Glicksberg (1952). Let ^k be the strategy prole in the game  k corresponding
to this equilibrium. Then ^k is an ex-ante equilibrium of  k. By Theorem A.1, since all
information sets are on the equilibrium path, there exists an interim belief system k such
that
 
^k; k

is sequentially optimal. By Theorem 3.1, there exists an interim belief system
^k satisfying the smooth rule using ^k such that
 
^k; ^k

is a sequential optimum of  k. By
compactness of the set of strategy proles, the sequence ^k has a convergent sub-sequence,
the limit of which is denoted by ^. By continuity in the strategy prole of the smooth rule
formula and compactness of the set of interim belief systems, an associated sub-sequence
of ^k converges to a limit interim belief system which we denote by ^. By continuity of
the payo¤ functions, ^ is an ex-ante equilibrium of  . Given any information set Ii and
continuation strategy ~Iii of player i in  , let ~
k;Ii
i be a feasible strategy in  
k for this player
that is closest (in the sup-norm) to ~Iii . Since, by sequential optimality of (^
k; ^k) for each
k, ^k;Iii is weakly better than ~
k;Ii
i for player i given belief ^
k
i;Ii
, and since, along the sub-
sequence, ~k;Iii converges to ~
Ii
i and ^
k
i;Ii
converges to ^i;Ii, continuity of the payo¤ functions
implies that ^Iii is weakly better than ~
Ii
i for this player given belief ^i;Ii . Therefore (^; ^)
satises sequential optimality. Finally, observe that (^; ^) satises smooth rule consistency
(since it is explicitly constructed as the limit of an appropriate sequence). Therefore (^; ^)
is an SEA of  .
Our next result provides an explicit formula for interim belief systems satisfying smooth
rule consistency. This smooth rule-like formula, which will be generally useful when working
with SEA, uses a limit of likelihoods of the partial histories in an information set given 
and k i. Before stating the result, we need some notation and a lemma:
Notation A.1 Let p i; i(h
tjh0) denote limk!1
p i;k i
(htjh0)X
h^t2Ii
p i;k i
(h^tjh^0)
, where t = s(Ii). For each
57
information set Ii, consider the smallest 0  r  t such that there exists h 2 H and I^i for
which ht 2 Ii, hr 2 I^i and p(htjhr) > 0. This generates an I^i for each Ii. Let Fi; denote
the set of all these I^i that are non-singleton and for which I^i * .
The next lemma shows that existence of p i; i(h
tjh0) need be checked only at information
sets in Fi;.
Lemma A.3 Fix a game  , a strategy prole  and a sequence of completely mixed strategy
proles fkg1k=1 such that limk!1 k = . If p i; i(htjh0) exists for each player i and each
ht 2 Ii 2 Fi;, then p i; i(htjh0) exists for each i and ht 2 Ii 2 Ii.
Proof of Lemma A.3. If Ii is a singleton, p i; i(h
tjh0) = 1. If Ii * , consider the
I^i 2 Fi; corresponding to Ii, and if Ii  , set I^i = Ii. Let r = s(I^i). Observe that for all
ht 2 Ii, p i; i(htjh0) = limk!1
p i;k i
(htjhr)
p i;k i
(hr jh0)X
~hr2I^i
p i;k i
(~hr j~h0)
X
h^t2Ii
p i;k i
(h^tjh^r)
p i;k i
(h^r jh^0)X
~hr2I^i
p i;k i
(~hr j~h0)
=
p i; i (h
tjhr)p i; i (hrjh0)X
h^t2Ii
p i; i (h^
tjh^r)p i; i (h^rjh^0)
,
where the last equality follows since
X
h^t2Ii
p i; i(h^
tjh^r) > 0 and p i; i(hrjh0) exists for all
hr 2 I^i (either by assumption since I^i 2 Fi;, or, if I^i  , because it is constant in k). Thus
p i; i(h
tjh0) exists.
Theorem A.2 Fix a game  , a strategy prole  and a sequence of completely mixed strategy
proles fkg1k=1 such that limk!1 k = . Then (; ) satises smooth rule consistency
using fkg1k=1 if and only if, for fkg1k=1, p i; i(htjh0) exists for each player i and each
ht 2 Ii 2 Fi;, and  satises the formula
i;Ii() /
X
^2()j^Ii=
0i
P
h2H
ui(h)p(hjh0)^(h0)

0i
 P
hjht2Ii
ui(h)p(hjht)(ht)
! (A.12)

0@X
ht2Ii
p i; i(h
tjh0)^(h0)
1Ai(^)
for each i and Ii, where ^Ii 2 (Ii) is given by ^Ii(ht) =
p i; i (h
tjh0)^(h0)X
h^t2Ii
p i; i (h^
tjh^0)^(h^0)
for all ht 2 Ii.
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Proof of Theorem A.2. We rst establish that the formula and the assumed existence
of p i; i(h
tjh0) imply that (; ) satises smooth rule consistency using fkg1k=1. Fix i; Ii.
Since each k is completely mixed, the smooth rule using fkg1k=1 has bite at each information
set and so, applying the formulas in the smooth rule iteratively starting from i, for each k,
the belief ki;Ii determined by smooth rule updating using fkg1k=1 satises: for  2 (Ii),
ki;Ii() /
X
^2()j^Ii=
0i
P
h2H
ui(h)pk(hjh0)^(h0)

0i
 P
hjht2Ii
ui(h)pk(hjht)(ht)
! (A.13)

0@X
ht2Ii
p i;k i(h
tjh0)^(h0)
1Ai(^),
where
^Ii(h
t) =
p i;k i(h
tjh0)^(h0)X
h^t2Ii
p i;k i(h^
tjh^0)^(h^0)
for all ht 2 Ii.
It remains to show that the limit of ki;Ii equals i;Ii (as dened in (A.12)). Divide (A.13)
by
X
h^t2Ii
p i;k i(h^
tjh^0) > 0, which is constant with respect to . Then the limit of ki;Ii() is
proportional to:
lim
k!1
X
^2()j^Ii=
0i
P
h2H
ui(h)pk(hjh0)^(h0)

0i
 P
hjht2Ii
ui(h)pk(hjht)(ht)
! (A.14)

0BBB@X
ht2Ii
p i;k i(h
tjh0)X
h^t2Ii
p i;k i(h^
tjh^0)
^(h0)
1CCCAi(^).
By Lemma A.3, p i; i(h
tjh0) exists. Then (A.14) is proportional (in  2 (Ii)) to the right-
hand side of (A.12) since, whenever it exists, limk!1 ^Ii(h
t) = limk!1
p i;k i
(htjh0)^(h0)X
h^t2Ii
p i;k i
(h^tjh^0)X
h^t2Ii
p i;k i
(h^tjh^0)^(h^0)X
h^t2Ii
p i;k i
(h^tjh^0)
=
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p i; i (h
tjh0)^(h0)X
h^t2Ii
p i; i (h^
tjh^0)^(h^0)
= ^Ii(h
t). Therefore (; ) satises smooth rule consistency using fkg1k=1.
Next assume that (; ) satises smooth rule consistency using fkg1k=1. Therefore
 = limk!1 k, where each k is the interim belief system determined by smooth rule
updating using k (see (A.13) for the formula). Fix any i; Ii. The existence of limk!1 k, as
described in (A.14), requires the existence of limk!1
p i;k i
(hs(Ii)jh0)X
h^s(Ii)2Ii
p i;k i
(h^s(Ii)jh^0)
for each hs(Ii) 2 Ii.
Therefore, using fkg1k=1, p i; i(hs(Ii)jh0) exists for all information sets. Then (A.12) yields
a well dened interim belief system ^, and, by the argument in the earlier direction of this
proof, (; ^) satises smooth rule consistency using fkg1k=1. Thus ^ = limk!1 k = .
Therefore  satises (A.12) using fkg1k=1.
Theorem A.3 Fix a game  . Suppose (; ) is sequentially optimal and for each player i,
and each information set Ii * ,
P
hs(Ii)2Ii
p(h
s(Ii)jh0) > 0. Then there exists ^ satisfying
(A.12) such that (; ^) is an SEA.
Proof of Theorem A.3. Consider a sequence of a completely mixed strategy proles
converging to . Since the limits p i; i(h
si(Ii)jh0) in TheoremA.2 exist if P
hs(Ii)2Ii
p(h
s(Ii)jh0) >
0 for all Ii * , there exists ^ satisfying (A.12). Theorem A.2 then implies that (; ^) satises
smooth rule consistency, and is thus an SEA.
Finally, the next lemma shows that for many common specications of completely mixed
sequences fkg1k=1, p i;k i(htjh0) exists everywhere and has a simple formula.
Lemma A.4 Suppose k is such that, for each i and Ii, for all ai 2 Ai(Ii), ki (Ii) (ai) /
caik
dai with cai > 0 and dai  0. Then p i;k i(htjh0) exists for all i and Ii.
Proof of Lemma A.4. Under the assumption on k, for each i, Ii and ht 2 Ii,
p i;k i(h
tjh0) = lim
k!1
Q
j 6=i
Q
0s<t
kj (Ij(h
s)) (hs;j)X
h^t2Ii
Q
j 6=i
Q
0s<t
kj

Ij(h^s)

h^s;j
 = lim
k!1
Chtk
DhtX
h^t2Ii
Ch^tk
Dh^t
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for Cht =
Q
j 6=i
Q
0s<t
chs;j and Dht =
P
j 6=i
P
0s<t
dhs;j . This limit exists and is equal to
X
h^t2fhtgjDh^t=maxht2Ii Dht
Ch^t
X
h^t2IijDh^t=maxht2Ii Dht
Ch^t
.
A.4 Proofs of results in Section 4.1
This subsection contains an example and formal results on comparative statics in ambiguity
aversion.
A.4.1 Example: New Strategic Behavior in Equilibrium
We present a 3-player game, with incomplete information about player 1, in which a path of
play can occur as part of an SEA when players 2 and 3 are su¢ ciently ambiguity averse, but
never occurs as part of even an ex-ante equilibrium if we modify the game by making players
2 and 3 ambiguity neutral (expected utility). Furthermore, under the SEA we construct,
player 1 achieves a higher expected payo¤ than under any ex-ante equilibrium of the game
with ambiguity neutral players, and even outside the convex hull of such ex-ante equilibrium
payo¤s. The game is depicted in Figure A.1.
There are three players: 1,2 and 3. First, it is determined whether player 1 is of type I or
type II and 1 observes her own type. Players 2 and 3 have only one type, so there is complete
information about them. The payo¤ triples in Figure A.1 describe vNM utility payo¤s given
playersactions and player 1s type (i.e., (u1; u2; u3) means that player i receives ui). Players
2 and 3 have ambiguity about player 1s type and have smooth ambiguity preferences with an
associated 2 = 3 =  and 2 = 3 = . Player 1 also has smooth ambiguity preferences,
but nothing in what follows depends on either 1 or 1. Player 1s rst and only move
in the game is to choose between action P (lay) which leads to players 2 and 3 playing a
simultaneous move game in which their payo¤s depend on 1s type, and action Q(uit), which
ends the game.24
24Note that to eliminate any possible e¤ects of varying playersrisk aversion, think of the playo¤s being
generated using lotteries over two physicaloutcomes, the better of which has utility u normalized to 5=2
and the worse of which has u normalized to 0. So, for example, the payo¤ 1 can be thought of as generated
by the lottery giving the better outcome with probability 2=5 and the worse outcome with probability 3=5.
61
III
1
Q
Q
P
P
2
D
D
U
U
3
R
L
R
L
(1,0,0)
(1,0,0)
(2,1,1)
(0,1,0)
(0,1,   )
(2,1,1)
2
5
1
L
R
(0,  , 0)
(0,  , 1)
L
R
(0,0,  )
(0,0,1)
2
5
2
5
2
5
Figure A.1: New equilibrium behavior with ambiguity aversion
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Proposition A.1 Suppose players 2 and 3 are ambiguity neutral and have a common belief
. There is no ex-ante equilibrium such that player 1 plays P with positive probability.
Proof of Proposition A.1. Observe that player 1 is willing ex-ante to play P with
positive probability if and only if, after the play of P , (U;R) will be played with probability
at least 1
2
. Suppose there is an ex-ante equilibrium, , in which P is played with positive
probability. Let pI and pII denote the probabilities according to  that types I and II,
respectively, of player 1 play P . Then player 2 is nds it optimal to play U with positive
probability if and only if
pI
X
2()
()((I)) + pII
X
2()
()(1  (I))  5
2
pII
X
2()
()(1  (I))
which is equivalent to
pI
X
2()
()((I))  3
2
pII
X
2()
()(1  (I)). (A.15)
Similarly, player 3 nds it optimal to play R with positive probability if and only if
pI
X
2()
()((I)) + pII
X
2()
()(1  (I))  5
2
pI
X
2()
()((I))
which is equivalent to
pI
X
2()
()((I))  2
3
pII
X
2()
()(1  (I)). (A.16)
Since (A.15) and (A.16) cannot both be satised when pI + pII > 0 (i.e., P is played with
positive probability),  must specify that (P;U;R) is never realized as part of a history. This
implies that player 1 has an ex-ante protable deviation to the strategy of always playing
Q, contradicting the assumption that  is an ex-ante equilibrium.
Since  being part of a sequentially optimal (; ) implies  is an ex-ante equilibrium,
Proposition A.1 immediately implies that none of the stronger concepts such as SEA, PBE
or sequential equilibrium can admit the play of P with positive probability under ambiguity
neutrality. The next result shows that the situation changes dramatically under su¢ cient
ambiguity aversion.
Proposition A.2 There exist  and  (e.g., (x)   e x and (0) = (1) = 12 , where
0(I) = 1 and 1(I) = 0) such that in an SEA both types of player 1 play P with probability
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1, and (U;R) is played with probability greater than 1
2
.
Proof of Proposition A.2. Let  put probability 1
2
on 0 and 12 on 1, where 0(I) = 1
and 1(I) = 0.25 Let (x)   e x.26 Let  be a strategy prole specifying that both types
of player 1 play P with probability 1, player 2 plays U with probability  if given the move
and player 3 plays R with probability  if given the move, where  = 1  2
5
ln(3=2). Notice
that according to , (P;U;R) occurs with probability
 
1  2
5
ln(3=2)
2
> 7
10
. Observe that
player 1 strictly prefers ex-ante to play P with probability 1 for both types if and only if,
after the play of P , (U;R) will be played with probability greater than 1
2
. The same is true
for each type of player 1 after her type is realized as well. Player 2 ex-ante chooses the
probability,  2 [0; 1], with which to play U if given the move to maximize
 1
2
e    1
2
e (+
5
2
(1 )).
One can verify that the maximum is reached at  = . Similarly, player 3 ex-ante chooses
the probability,  2 [0; 1], with which to play R if given the move to maximize
 1
2
e (+
5
2
(1 ))   1
2
e 
which is again maximized at  = .
Now consider the following sequence of completely mixed strategies with limit : k has
each type of player 1 play P with probability 1  1
k+1
, and leaves the strategies otherwise the
same as in . By Lemma A.4, Theorem A.2 provides a formula (A.12) for an interim belief
system  satisfying smooth rule consistency. Recall that player 1 learns the parameter at the
beginning of the game. Thus we need only be concerned with the beliefs of players 2 and 3.
Therefore (; ) satises smooth rule consistency. It remains to show (; ) is sequentially
optimal. Since
2;fI;IIgfPg((I;P ))
2;fI;IIgfPg((II;P ))
=
3;fI;IIgfPgfU;Dg((II;P ))
3;fI;IIgfPgfU;Dg((I;P ))
=
0i(
)
0i(
)
1
2
0i(+ 52 (1 ))
0i(+ 52 (1 ))
1
2
= 1,
 remains optimal for players 2 and 3 following the play of P given . Thus, (; ) is
sequentially optimal. It is therefore an SEA.
As the proof of Proposition A.2 mentions, the example  is chosen for simplicity, and
25The degeneracy of the  in the support of  is not necessary for the argument to go through it merely
shortens some calculations and reduces the ambiguity aversion required.
26Any more concave  will also work, as will any  more concave than  e x for  =  4(ln(2=3))
5(2 p2)  0:554.
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degeneracy of the measures in its support is not necessary for the result.
A.4.2 Formal Comparative Statics in Ambiguity Aversion
Notation A.2 For a game   = (N;H; (Ii)i2N ; (i)i2N ; (ui; i)i2N), let E ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N)
denote the set of all ex-ante equilibria of the game  ^ = (N;H; (Ii)i2N ; (^i)i2N ; (ui; ^i)i2N)
di¤ering from   only in ambiguity aversions and beliefs. Let Q ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N) denote
the analogous set of sequentially optimal strategy proles and S ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N) denote the
analogous set of SEA strategy proles.
Notation A.3 Denote the identity function by .
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We show that there exists a game   and (^i)i2N such that
E ((i)i2N ; (^i)i2N) \ E ((i)i2N ; ()i2N) = ;.
Modify Example A.4.1 by removing the action Q for Player 1. For each player i, let i = 
where  puts probability 1
2
on 0 and 12 on 1, where 0(I) = 1 and 1(I) = 0, and let
^i(x) =  e x for all i. With these preferences, the unique ex-ante equilibrium has player 2
play U with probability  and player 3 play R with probability , where  = 1  2
5
ln(3=2).
In contrast, when i =  for all i, using the same , then the unique ex-ante equilibrium has
player 2 playing D with probability 1 and player 3 play L with probability 1.
Examination of the proof shows that, xing beliefs, not only are the equilibrium strategies
distinct under ambiguity aversion compared to ambiguity neutrality, but it can also be
that the strategies under ambiguity aversion generate paths of play that do not occur in
equilibrium under ambiguity neutrality. An analogue of Theorem 4.1 is true for sequential
optima, SEA and any other renement of ex-ante equilibria as well, as they are all ex-ante
equilibria. Thus, with xed beliefs, change in ambiguity aversion can impact the set of
equilibrium strategies and realized play.
Further examination of the proof shows that ambiguity aversion continues to a¤ect the
equilibrium set even if we impose common beliefs (i.e., i =  for all players i). The next
result addresses the question of whether ambiguity aversion plus the assumption of common
beliefs has equilibrium implications that are di¤erent from ambiguity neutrality plus the
assumption of common beliefs. It shows that, in this case, ambiguity aversion always weakly
expands the set of equilibria compared to ambiguity neutrality and may do so strictly:
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We show: For all games   and (^i)i2N ,
S
^E ((^)i2N ; (^i)i2N) S
^E ((^)i2N ; ()i2N), and the same holds when Q or S replaces E; moreover, there exists a
game   and (^i)i2N such that all these inclusions are strict and some of the new equilibrium
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strategies induce new paths of play. That
S
^E ((^)i2N ; (^i)i2N) 
S
^E ((^)i2N ; ()i2N)
follows by considering only degenerate beliefs on the left-hand side and choosing them to
have the same reduced measure as the right-hand side beliefs.
S
^Q ((^)i2N ; (^i)i2N) S
^Q ((^)i2N ; ()i2N) follows using the same construction and additionally taking the left-
hand side updated beliefs at each information set to be degenerate with the same reduced
measure as the right-hand side updated beliefs at the corresponding information set and
noting that this preserves optimality at each information set.
S
^ S ((^)i2N ; (^i)i2N) S
^ S ((^)i2N ; ()i2N) follows using the same construction as for sequential optima, observing
that the left-hand side degenerate beliefs satisfy smooth rule consistency since the right-hand
side beliefs do so. As shown by Propositions 3.1 and 3.3, in the running example with su¢ -
cient ambiguity aversion and x  0:5 the inclusion is strict and the new strategies generate
new paths of play.
Next, in the constructive proof of Theorem 4.3, we show that beliefs ^i and ^i;Ii that
support a given equilibrium prole  are related to the beliefs i and i;Ii in the game with
the original ambiguity aversion(s) by the formulae in (A.17) and (A.18) where the i are the
original and ^i the new specications of ambiguity aversions.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Fix a game  . We show: For all (^i)i2N ,[
(^i)i2N
E ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N) =
[
(^i)i2N
E ((^i)i2N ; (i)i2N),
and the same holds when Q or S replaces E.
Let  2 E ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N). Ex-ante equilibrium is equivalent to ex-ante optimality for
all players i of i according to is preferences given  i. This ex-ante optimality is equivalent
to 0i = i maximizing (4.1) with respect to 
0
i. Let ^i be the probability measure such that
^i() /
0i (
P
h ui(h)p(hjh0)(h0))
^
0
i (
P
h ui(h)p(hjh0)(h0))
i(). (A.17)
Observe that replacing i and i with ^i and ^i leaves the e¤ective beliefs at , and so also
(4.1), unchanged up to proportionality. Thus i is ex-ante optimal for player i given ^i, ^i
and  i. As this is true for each player i,  2 E ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N).
Turn now to sequentially optimal strategy proles. Suppose  2 Q ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N) and
 is an interim belief system such that (; ) is sequentially optimal for  . Let ^i be dened
as in (A.17) and for each Ii, ^i;Ii be the probability measure such that
^i;Ii() /
0i
P
hjhs(Ii)2Ii ui(h)p(hjhs(Ii))(hs(Ii))

^
0
i
P
hjhs(Ii)2Ii ui(h)p(hjhs(Ii))(hs(Ii))
i;Ii(). (A.18)
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By the argument in the ex-ante equilibrium part of this proof,  2 E ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N).
Optimality for player i at Ii as a function of 0i is equivalent (see (2.5) and (2.6)) to 
0
i = i
maximizing
X
2(Ii)
0@ X
hjhs(Ii)2Ii
ui(h)p(0i; i)(hjhs(Ii))(hs(Ii))
1A0i
0@ X
hjhs(Ii)2Ii
ui(h)p(hjhs(Ii))(hs(Ii))
1A i;Ii()
(A.19)
with respect to 0i. Observe that replacing i and i;Ii with ^i and ^i;Ii leaves (A.19) un-
changed up to proportionality. This is true for each player i and Ii. Thus, (; ^) is sequen-
tially optimal in  ^.
We now extend the argument to SEA. Suppose  2 S ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N) and  is an
interim belief system such that (; ) is an SEA for   (with corresponding sequence of
completely mixed strategy proles fkg1k=1). By Theorem A.2,  satises (A.12) using
fkg1k=1. As above, let ^i be as in (A.17) and for each Ii, ^i;Ii be dened as in (A.18). By
our previous arguments, (; ^) is sequentially optimal in  ^. It remains to show that (; ^)
satises smooth rule consistency in  ^. Observe that replacing i, i and i;Ii with ^i, ^i
and ^i;Ii in (A.12) preserves its validity. Thus, by Theorem A.2, (; ^) satises smooth rule
consistency in  ^. Therefore (; ^) is an SEA of  ^.
The above arguments have shown E ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N) 
S
(^i)i2N
E ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N),
Q ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N) 
S
(^i)i2N
Q ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N) and S ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N) S
(^i)i2N
S ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N). Applying these arguments twice (the second time with the roles
of i and ^i interchanged), we obtain that, for any game, the union over all beliefs of the set
of equilibrium strategy proles is independent of ambiguity aversion.
Finally, turn to the case of pure strategies and only pure strategy deviations as in Batti-
galli et al. (2015). Modify the equilibrium set notation to restrict attention to pure strategies:
Denition A.2 For a game   = (N;H; (Ii)i2N ; (i)i2N ; (ui; i)i2N), let ~E ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N)
be the set of all ex-ante equilibria with respect to pure strategies of a game  ^ = (N , H,
(Ii)i2N , (^i)i2N , (ui; ^i)i2N) di¤ering from   only in ambiguity aversions and beliefs. Let
~Q ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N) and ~S ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N) be the analogous respective sets of sequentially
optimal and SEA strategy proles with respect to pure strategies.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Fix a game  . We show that: For all (^i)i2N such that, for
each i, ^i is at least as concave as i, ~E ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N) 
S
(^i)i2N
~E ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N),
and the same holds when ~Q or ~S replaces ~E. There exists a game   and (^i)i2N such that
for each i, ^i is at least as concave as i, all these inclusions are strict and some of the new
equilibrium strategies induce new paths of play.
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Suppose & 2 ~E ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N), for each i, ^i = i(i) for some increasing, di¤erentiable
and concave i (note that di¤erentiability of i is implied by the continuous di¤erentiability
of ^i in the class of games considered in this paper) and ^i is the probability measure such
that
^i() /
i()
0i (i (
P
h ui(h)p&(hjh0)(h0)))
. (A.20)
By denition of ~E ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N), for each i and each &
0
i,
X

i
 X
h
ui(h)p&(hjh0)(h0)
!
i() 
X

i
 X
h
ui(h)p(&0i;& i)(hjh0)(h0)
!
i().
(A.21)
Since i is increasing, di¤erentiable and concave, for each ,
i
 
i
 X
h
ui(h)p&(hjh0)(h0)
!!
  i
 
i
 X
h
ui(h)p(&0i;& i)(hjh0)(h0)
!!
 0i
 
i
 X
h
ui(h)p&(hjh0)(h0)
!!

"
i
 X
h
ui(h)p&(hjh0)(h0)
!
  i
 X
h
ui(h)p(&0i;& i)(hjh0)(h0)
!#
.
Thus, dividing both sides by 0i (i (
P
h ui(h)p&(hjh0)(h0))) and taking the expectation with
respect to i yields
X

i
 
i
 X
h
ui(h)p&(hjh0)(h0)
!!
  i
 
i
 X
h
ui(h)p(&0i;& i)(hjh0)(h0)
!!
^i()

X

"
i
 X
h
ui(h)p&(hjh0)(h0)
!
  i
 X
h
ui(h)p(&0i;& i)(hjh0)(h0)
!#
i  0,
where the last inequality follows from A.21. Since this is true for each i and each & 0i, & 2
~E ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N). This shows ~E ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N) 
S
(^i)i2N
~E ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N).
Turn now to the part of the theorem about sequentially optimal strategy proles. Suppose
& 2 ~Q ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N) and  is an interim belief system such that (&; ) is sequentially
optimal for   with respect to pure strategies. Further suppose that for each i, ^i = i(i)
for some increasing, di¤erentiable and concave i, ^i is dened as in (A.20), and for each Ii,
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^i;Ii is the probability measure such that
^i;Ii() /
i;Ii()
0i

i
P
hjhs(Ii)2Ii ui(h)p&(hjhs(Ii))(hs(Ii))
 .
By the argument in the ex-ante equilibrium part of this proof, & 2 ~E ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N). By
denition of ~Q ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N), for each i, each Ii and each &
0
i,
X

i
0@ X
hjhs(Ii)2Ii
ui(h)p&(hjhs(Ii))(hs(Ii))
1A i;Ii() (A.22)

X

i
0@ X
hjhs(Ii)2Ii
ui(h)p(&0i;& i)(hjhs(Ii))(hs(Ii))
1A i;Ii().
Since i is increasing, di¤erentiable and concave, for each  we repeat the argument in the
ex-ante equilibrium part of this proof to conclude that & 2 ~Q ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N). This shows
~Q ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N) 
S
(^i)i2N
~Q ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N).
Finally, turn to the part of the theorem about SEA strategy proles. Suppose & 2
~S ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N) and  is an interim belief system such that (&; ) is an SEA for   with
respect to pure strategies, where the sequence used in satisfying smooth rule consistency is
fkg1k=1. By Theorem A.2,  satises (A.12) using fkg1k=1. Further suppose that for each
i, ^i = i(i) for some increasing, di¤erentiable and concave i, ^i is dened as in (A.20),
and, for each Ii, ^i;Ii is dened as in (A.22). By the arguments in the sequentially optimal
part of the proof, & 2 ~Q ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N). Observe that replacing i, i and i;Ii with ^i,
^i and ^i;Ii in (A.12) preserves its validity. Thus, by Theorem A.2, (; ^) satises smooth
rule consistency in  ^. Thus & 2 ~S ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N). This shows ~S ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N) S
(^i)i2N
~S ((^i)i2N ; (^i)i2N).
To prove that strict inclusions may happen, consider the game depicted in Figure A.2.
There are two players, 1 and 2. First, it is determined whether player 2 is of type I or type
II and 2 observes the type. Player 1 does not observe the type. The payo¤ pairs in Figure
A.2 describe vNM utility payo¤s given playersactions and type (i.e., (u1; u2) means that
player i receives ui). Player 1s rst move in the game is to choose between action T (wo)
which gives the move to player 2 and action B(et) (i.e., betting that player 2 is of type II)
which reveals the type and ends the game. If T , then player 2s move is a choice between
C(ontinue) which leads to player 1 again having a non-trivial move, and S(top) which reveals
the type and ends the game. If C, then player 1 has a choice between G(amble) and H(edge)
after which the game ends.
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1
T
T
B
B
2
2
S
S
C
C
1
H
H
G
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(0,0)
(4,0)
(0,2)
(0,2)
(2,3)
(2,3)
(6,   )
(0,1)
2
3
Figure A.2: Ambiguity aversion generates new equilibria with respect to pure strategies
Under ambiguity neutrality for both players,
S
(i)i2N
~E ((i)i2N ; ()i2N) = f(B; (S; S); H);
(B; (S; S); G); (B; (C; S); H); (B; (C; S); G); (B; (S;C); H); (B; (S;C); G); (B; (C;C); H);
(B; (C;C); G)g. To see this, rst note that if P (I)1() 2 (0; 25), then all the pure
proles where 1 plays B are ex-ante equilibria under ambiguity neutrality. Second, any pure
prole where 1 plays T cannot be an ex-ante equilibrium under ambiguity neutrality. Ob-
serve that 2 plays C following T (under either type) only if 1 plays H, 1 can play H rather
than G on-path if and only if 2  6P (I)1(), and 1 can play T followed by H rather
than B if and only if p(C)2  4(1 P (I)1()) where 0  p(C)  1 is 1s reduced prob-
ability that the type is such that 2 plays C. Since
P
 (I)1() cannot be simultaneously
 1
3
and  1
2
, 1 cannot play T in pure strategy equilibrium under ambiguity neutrality.
By the weak inclusions already shown, and since SEA implies sequentially optimal,
which in turn implies ex-ante equilibrium, it is enough to show that for some strictly con-
cave ^1 there is an SEA strategy prole with respect to pure strategies not contained inS
(i)i2N
~E ((i)i2N ; ()i2N). To this end, suppose ^1(x)   e 2x, ^2   and 1(1) =
1(2) =
1
2
, where 1(I) = 14 and 2(I) =
3
4
. Consider the pure strategy prole (T; (C;C); H)
and a sequence of completely mixed strategy proles approaching it where the kth element
of the sequence has player 1 and each type of player 2 playing the action not assigned by
(T; (C;C); H) with probability 1
k+1
at any point they are given the move. By Lemma A.4
and Theorem A.2,  calculated using (A.12) with ^1 and 1 satises smooth rule consis-
tency. By Theorem 3.3, for sequential optimality, it is su¢ cient to check against one-stage
deviations, and therefore only at information sets where the player has a non-trivial move.
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For I1 = fI; IIg and I1 = fI; IIg  fTg  fCg, 1;I1((1)I1) = 1;I1((2)I1) = 12 . Since
^1(2) >
1
2
(^1(3) + ^1(1)) and ^1(2) >
1
2
(^1(
3
2
) + ^1(
9
2
)), 1 is best responding, and since C
is a best response for player 2 given any beliefs, (T; (C;C); H) is sequentially optimal with
respect to pure strategies given . Therefore (T; (C;C); H) 2 ~S ((i)i2N ; (^i)i2N) and the
proof is complete.
A.5 Proofs of results in Section 4.2
Parts of the next proof (of Theorem 4.5) make use of the following particularly convenient
set of ^i at least as concave as i, parametrized by l  1 and b  1, with ^i strictly more
concave than i when b > 1 and equal to i when b = 1:
Let eli denote the l
th lowest distinct value of
P
h2H ui(h)p(hjh0)(h0) generated by  in
the support, i, of i.
Denition A.3 For any l  1 such that el+1i exists, for b  1 let ^
l
i   li  i, where  li is
dened by
 li(y) =
8>><>>:
y + 1
2
(b  1)[i
 
eli

+ i
 
el+1i

] , y  i
 
el+1i

 (b 1)y2+2[bi(el+1i ) i(eli)]y (b 1)[i(eli)]2
2[i(el+1i ) i(eli)]
, i
 
eli

< y < i
 
el+1i

b  y , y  i
 
eli

.
When b > 1, it may be veried that any  li is continuously di¤erentiable, concave, strictly
increasing and not a¢ ne. Notice that for all x  eli, ^
l0
i (x) = b
0
i (x) and for all x  el+1i ,
^
l0
i (x) = 
0
i (x).
Proof of Theorem 4.5. This proof makes use of the E , Q  and S  notations
for sets of equilibria given in Notation A.2 (see p. 65). Fixing an ex-ante equilibrium
 2 E ((i)i2N ; (i)i2N) (resp. Q  with associated interim belief system  or S  with
associated  and sequence of completely mixed strategy proles fkg1k=1) and a player i, say
that ambiguity aversion makes i ex-ante (resp. sequentially optimal or SEA) belief robust if
for each "i 2 (0; 1jsuppij), there exists 
"i
i at least as concave as i so that i is an ex-ante best
response to  i given each ^i and ^i such that min2suppi ^i() > "i and ^i has the same
support, i, as i, and such that ^i at least as concave as 
"i
i (resp. that plus also a best
response to  i at each information set Ii given ^i and i;Ii or (for SEA) all of the previous
plus satisfying the part for player i of smooth rule consistency using fkg1k=1). To prove
that ambiguity aversion makes  ex-ante (resp. sequentially optimal or SEA) belief robust,
it is su¢ cient to show, for each player i, that ambiguity aversion makes i ex-ante (resp.
sequentially optimal or SEA) belief robust. The argument is the same for each player, so
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for the remainder of the proof x a player i. Also assume for the remainder of the argument
that jij > 1, as otherwise the result follows immediately because there is only one possible
belief with that support.
We begin by proving that ambiguity aversion makes i ex-ante belief robust. Recall
that i is an ex-ante best response to  i for player i given ^i and ^i if and only if i
maximizes, among all 0i, (4.1) with ^i replacing i and ^i replacing i. Observe that
any strategies 0i that are weakly worse than i (in terms of ex-ante expected payo¤,P
h2H ui(h)p(0i; i)(hjh0)(h0)) for all  2 i can never interfere with optimality of i and
will thus, without loss of generality, be ignored whenever making statements about strategies
other than i in what follows. For each l, denote by li the unique  2 i under which i
gives eli, the l
th lowest distinct ex-ante expected payo¤ generated by i. For each strategy
0i and 1  l  jij, denote
dli(
0
i) 
 X
h2H
ui(h)p(hjh0)li(h0) 
X
h2H
ui(h)p(0i; i)(hjh0)li(h0)
!
0i
 X
h2H
ui(h)p(hjh0)li(h0)
!
.
The conclusion of the theorem in the ex-ante case is immediate when all strategies 0i are
weakly worse than i for all li (i.e., d
l
i(
0
i)  0 for all l), so assume that there exists a
strategy 0i with d
l
i(
0
i) < 0 for some 1  l  jij.
We next show that all strategies 0i must have d
1
i (
0
i)  0. To see this, suppose, to the
contrary, there exists a strategy ^i with d1i (
0
i) < 0. Since  is ex-ante robust to increased
ambiguity aversion, i is an ex-ante best response to  i for player i given i and ^
1
i (from
Denition A.3), and, in particular, is at least as good as ^i. Using (4.1) with ^
1
i replacing
i, this implies
jijX
l=1
dli(^i)i() + (b  1)d1i (^i)  0.
Since the value of the rst term is bounded and d1i (^i) < 0, taking b large enough generates
a contradiction.
For each pure strategy & 0i, let m(&
0
i) < jij be the smallest number l for which dl+1i (& 0i) <
0. By the previous paragraph, m(& 0i)  1. By the denition of m(& 0i), dli(& 0i)  0 for all
1  l  m(& 0i). Furthermore, dli(& 0i) > 0 for some 1  l  m(& 0i), because otherwise & 0i could
be used together with i and ^
m(&0i)+1
i to generate a contradiction to i being ex-ante robust
to increased ambiguity aversion. Thus
Pm(&0i)
l=1 d
l
i(&
0
i) > 0 and minm(&0i)+1ljij d
l
i(&
0
i) < 0. For
each 1  m < jij, if there exists no pure strategy & 0i with m(& 0i) = m, then let B(m) = 1,
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otherwise let
B(m)  maxf1; max
&0ijm(&0i)=m
 minm+1ljij dli(& 0i)
"i
Pm
l=1 d
l
i(&
0
i)
g,
which is well dened because the set of pure strategies is nite. Dene "ii =  
1
i ::: jij 1i i,
for  mi with b = B(m) for each 1  m < jij. Consider ^i at least as concave as "ii , i.e.,
^i =  i  "ii for some  i continuously di¤erentiable, concave and strictly increasing. For
any ^i such that min2suppi ^i() > "i and ^i has the same support as i, and any pure
strategy & 0i,
X
2i
 X
h2H
ui(h)p(hjh0)(h0) 
X
h2H
ui(h)p(&0i; i)(hjh0)(h0)
!
^0i
 X
h2H
ui(h)p(hjh0)(h0)
!
^i()
=
jijX
l=1
dli(&
0
i) 
0
i
 

"i
i
 X
h2H
ui(h)p(hjh0)li(h0)
!!0@jij 1Y
m=l
B(m)
1A ^i(li)
  0i
 

"i
i
 X
h2H
ui(h)p(hjh0)m(&
0
i)
i (h
0)
!!0@ jij 1Y
m=m(&0i)+1
B(m)
1A

0@B[m(& 0i)]"i m(&0i)X
l=1
dli(&
0
i) + min
m(&0i)+1ljij
dli(&
0
i)
1A
 0,
where the last inequality follows by applying the denition of B[m(& 0i)]. Therefore, i does
at least as well as any pure strategy & 0i given  i according to (4.1) with ^i and ^i replacing
i and i. Since (4.1) is linear in the mixing weights in 
0
i, this is su¢ cient to conclude that
i is a best response to  i given ^i and ^i. Therefore ambiguity aversion makes i ex-ante
belief robust.
Consider now sequential optimality. Consider "ii and ^i as dened above. Since  is
sequentially optimal robust to increased ambiguity aversion, i is an ex-ante best response to
 i given i and ^i, and for each information set Ii there exists a belief i;Ii such that i is a
best response at Ii to  i given i;Ii and ^i. Consider any ^i such that min2suppi ^i() > "i
and ^i has the same support as i. By the ex-ante equilibrium argument above, i is an
ex-ante best response to  i given ^i and ^i. Given ^i and ^i, derive ^i;Ii from the smooth
rule using  for those information sets Ii for which that rule implies that ^i;Ii must vary with
ex-ante beliefs. By Lemma A.1, i an ex-ante best response to  i given ^i and ^i implies
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i is a best response to  i at these information sets given ^i and ^i;Ii. Extend ^ by setting
^i;Ii = i;Ii elsewhere. Thus i is a best response to  i also at these remaining information
sets given ^i;Ii and ^i, as this fact is not a¤ected by the shift from i to ^i. This shows that
ambiguity aversion makes i sequentially optimal belief robust.
Finally turn to SEA. We establish the existence of beliefs at each Ii so that is part of
both sequential optimality and smooth rule consistency are satised. Since (; ) satises
smooth rule consistency using fkg1k=1, Theorem A.2 yields that p i; i(htjh0) exists for each
player i and each ht 2 Ii 2 Fi;. Given any ^i, for each Ii, construct a belief ^i;Ii as dened
in (A.12) using fkg1k=1 with ^i and ^i replacing i and i. Theorem A.2 applied with ^i
and ^i replacing i and i (and noting that p i; i(h
tjh0) is independent of the choice of ^i
and ^i) implies that  together with ^ satises player is part of smooth rule consistency
using fkg1k=1 given ^i and ^i.
Showing that i is a best response to  i for player i at each Ii given ^i;Ii and ^i is
equivalent to showing that
i 2 arg max
0i
X
^2i
0@ X
hjhs(Ii)2Ii
ui(h)p(0i; i)(hjhs(Ii))p i; i(hs(Ii)jh0)^(h0)
1A (A.23)
^0i
 X
h2H
ui(h)p(hjh0)^(h0)
!
^i(^),
as can be seen by considering (A.19) with ^i;Ii replacing i;Ii and ^i replacing i, substituting
for ^i;Ii and ^Ii using (A.12), replacing the summation over  2  (Ii) and ^ 2  () such
that ^Ii =  with summation over ^ 2 i since each element in the support of ^i;Ii is ^Ii
for some ^ in the support of ^i, and simplifying, including, since  no longer appears in the
expression, replacing the notation ^ 2  () with  2  ().
Since  is SEA robust to increased ambiguity aversion, i is an ex-ante best response
to  i given i and ^
1
i , and for any Ii there exists a belief i;Ii , constructed as was ^i;Ii at
the beginning of the SEA part of the proof except now using i and ^
1
i , such that i is a
best response to  i given i;Ii and ^
1
i . From the denition of ^
1
i , the assumption that 
1
i
is well-dened and the assumption that the same sequence fkg1k=1 can be used in smooth
rule consistency for each ^i (which ensures use of the same p i; i(h
s(Ii)jh0)), (A.23) with
^i = i and ^i = ^
1
i with b large enough (i.e., ^
1
i su¢ ciently concave) implies that, for each
Ii, 0i = i must maximize the following expected payo¤ under 
1
i ,X
hjhs(Ii)2Ii
ui(h)p(0i; i)(hjhs(Ii))p i; i(hs(Ii)jh0)1i (h0),
74
and, by the corresponding argument for ex-ante equilibrium, also maximizes the ex-ante
expected payo¤ under 1i .
For each Ii, 0i and 1  l  jij, denote
dli;Ii(
0
i) 
0@ X
hjhs(Ii)2Ii
ui(h)p(hjhs(Ii))p i; i(hs(Ii)jh0)li(h0)
 
X
hjhs(Ii)2Ii
ui(h)p(0i; i)(hjhs(Ii))p i; i(hs(Ii)jh0)li(h0)
1A  0i
 X
h2H
ui(h)p(hjh0)li(h0)
!
.
That i is a best response to  i for player i at Ii is immediate when dli;Ii(&
0
i)  0 for
all pure strategies & 0i and l, so assume that d
l
i;Ii
(& 0i) < 0 for some &
0
i and 1  l  jij.
For each Ii and any such & 0i (as any other strategy can never interfere with optimality of
i at Ii and thus, without loss of generality, may be ignored), let mi;Ii(&
0
i) < jij be the
smallest number l for which dl+1i;Ii (&
0
i) < 0. By the previous paragraph, mi;Ii(&
0
i)  1. By
the denition of mi;Ii(&
0
i), d
l
i;Ii
(& 0i)  0 for all 1  l  m(& 0i). Furthermore, dli;Ii(& 0i) > 0 for
some 1  l  mi;Ii(& 0i), because otherwise & 0i could be used together with i and ^
mi;Ii (&
0
i)+1
i
to generate a contradiction to i being SEA robust to increased ambiguity aversion. ThusPmi;Ii (&0i)
l=1 d
l
i;Ii
(& 0i) > 0 and minmi;Ii (&0i)+1ljij d
l
i;Ii
(& 0i) < 0. For each 1  m < jij, if there
exists no pure strategy & 0i with mi;Ii(&
0
i) = m, then let Bi;Ii(m) = 1, otherwise let
Bi;Ii(m)  maxf1; max
&0ijmi;Ii (&0i)=m
 minm+1ljij dli;Ii(& 0i)
"i
Pm
l=1 d
l
i;Ii
(& 0i)
g,
which is well dened because the set of pure strategies is nite. Dene "ii =  
1
i ::: jij 1i i,
for  mi with b = B(m)  maxfB(m);maxIi2Ii Bi;Ii(m)g for each 1  m < jij, where B(m)
is as dened in the ex-ante part of the proof. Consider ^i at least as concave as 
"i
i , i.e.,
^i =  i"ii for some  i continuously di¤erentiable, concave and strictly increasing. Consider
any ^i such that min2suppi ^i() > "i and ^i has the same support as i. By the argument
above for ex-ante equilibrium, i is an ex-ante best response to  i given ^i and ^i. For any
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Ii and pure strategy & 0i,
X
2i
0@ X
hjhs(Ii)2Ii
ui(h)p(hjhs(Ii))p i; i(hs(Ii)jh0)(h0)
 
X
hjhs(Ii)2Ii
ui(h)p(0i; i)(hjhs(Ii))p i; i(hs(Ii)jh0)(h0)
1A  ^0i
 X
h2H
ui(h)p(hjh0)(h0)
!
^i()
=
jijX
l=1
dli;Ii(&
0
i) 
0
i
 

"i
i
 X
h2H
ui(h)p(hjh0)li(h0)
!!0@jij 1Y
m=l
B(m)
1A ^i(li)
  0i
 

"i
i
 X
h2H
ui(h)p(hjh0)mi;Ii (&
0
i)
i (h
0)
!!0@ jij 1Y
m=mi;Ii (&
0
i)+1
B(m)
1A

0@ B[mi;Ii(& 0i)]"i mi;Ii (&
0
i)X
l=1
dli(&
0
i) + min
mi;Ii (&
0
i)+1ljij
dli(&
0
i)
1A
 0,
where the last inequality follows by applying the denition of B[m(& 0i)]. Therefore, i does
at least as well as any pure strategy & 0i given  i according to (A.23) with ^i and ^i replacing
i and i. Since (A.23) is linear in the mixing weights in 
0
i, this is su¢ cient to conclude
that i is a best response to  i for player i at each Ii given ^i;Ii and ^i. Furthermore,
by construction,  together with beliefs ^i;Ii for player i satisfy player is part of smooth
rule consistency using fkg1k=1 given ^i and ^i. Therefore ambiguity aversion makes i SEA
belief robust.
Proof of Remark 4.1. Assume i is twice continuously di¤erentiable with strictly
positive rst derivative and recall that, all along, it was assumed to be strictly increasing
and concave. In the proof of Theorem 4.5, "ii was taken to be  
1
i  ::: jij 1i i. From the
denition of the  mi , it follows that 
"i
i is twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and concave
and has bounded second derivative. Take this "ii and let (
"i
i )
 1 be its inverse. We want to
show that there exists an ("i) > 0 and an increasing, concave transformation  such that
 e ("i)x = ["ii (x)] for all x 2 co(ui(H)). For any y 2 "ii [co(ui(H))],  e ("i)x = ["ii (x)]
implies (y) =  e ("i)("ii ) 1(y), which is increasing. Thus  0(y) = ("i)e ("i)(

"i
i
) 1(y)
(
"i
i )
0[("ii ) 1(y)]
, and
the sign of  00(y) is the sign of  ("i)e ("i)(
"i
i )
 1(y)

("i)  (  (
"i
i )
00[("ii )
 1(y)]
(
"i
i )
0[("ii ) 1(y)]
)

, so  is
concave for all su¢ ciently large ("i), since   (
"i
i )
00(x)
(
"i
i )
0(x) , the coe¢ cient of ambiguity aversion
at x 2 co(ui(H)) is non-negative and bounded above. Note that ("ii )00(x) is bounded
because the composition of any functions f and g that have bounded second derivatives and
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continuous, strictly positive rst derivatives has bounded second derivatives and continuous,
strictly positive rst derivatives as follows from the formula f [g(x)]00 = [f 0[g(x)]g0(x)]0 =
f 00[g(x)][g0(x)]2+ f 0[g(x)]g00(x) and the fact that since i has bounded derivatives, as do the
 mi . Observe that the ("i) may need to be much higher than some   (

"i
i )
00(x)
(
"i
i )
0(x) since it must
be at least the supremum of this over x.
A.6 Proofs of results in Section 5
The next result relates to analysis of the ambiguous cheap talk example.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Since all information sets are on-path under the given
strategies, by Theorems A.1 and A.3 it is su¢ cient to establish that the given strategies
form an ex-ante equilibrium. Ps strategy is an ex-ante best response because it leads to
payo¤ 2 for all parameters, which is the highest feasible payo¤ for this player. Let m be
the probability with which agent r plays w after message m 2 f; g, and similarly let
m be the corresponding probabilities for agent c. The proposed strategies correspond to
 =  =  = 1 and  = 0. We now verify that these are ex-ante best responses. Denoting
k(IIU) + k(IID) by k(II), given the strategies of the others, r maximizes
1
2
2X
k=1
r
 
k(IU) + 2k(ID) + k(II)[2 + 5(1  )]

.
Since this function is strictly increasing in , it is clearly maximized at  = 1. The rst
derivative with respect to  evaluated at  =  = 1 is
1
2
2X
k=1
[2k(ID)  3k(II)]0r (2  k(IU))
=
11
8
e 11
39
20

e 11(
7
4
  39
20
)   42
5

> 0,
where the last line uses r(x) =  e 11x and the values of the k. Thus, by concavity in ,
the maximum is attained at  =  = 1. Similarly, given the strategies of the others, c
maximizes
1
2
2X
k=1
c (k(IU)[2 + 5(1  )] + k(ID)[2 + 5(1  )] + 2k(II)) .
Since this function is strictly decreasing in , it is clearly maximized at  = 0. The rst
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derivative with respect to  evaluated at  = 0 and  = 1 is
1
2
2X
k=1
[ 3k(ID) + 2k(II)]0c (3k(IU) + 2)
=  1
2
0c

11
4

+
23
40
0c

43
20

 3
40
0c

11
4

> 0,
where the last line uses the values of the k. Since c is weakly concave, the problem is
weakly concave in , thus the maximum is attained at  = 0 and  = 1.
Proof of Proposition 5.2.
Limit attention to strategies for P conditioning only on the payo¤ relevant component
of the parameter, I and II. Denote Ps probability of playing  conditional on the payo¤
relevant component by I and II , respectively. Let m be the probability with which r plays
w after message m 2 f; g, and similarly let m be the corresponding probabilities for c.
Given I and II , r chooses ;  to maximize
1
2
2X
k=1
r
0B@ k(I)[I(1 + ) + (1  I)(1 + )]+k(II)[II((1 + ) + 5(1  ))
+(1  II)((1 + ) + 5(1  ))]
1CA (A.24)
and c chooses ;  to maximize
1
2
2X
k=1
c
0B@ k(I)[I((1 + ) + 5(1  ))+(1  I)((1 + ) + 5(1  ))]
+k(II)[II(1 + ) + (1  II)(1 + )]
1CA . (A.25)
The proof proceeds by considering four cases, which together are exhaustive:
Case 1: When I = II = 1 (resp. I = II = 0) so that only one message is sent, for
P to always receive the maximal payo¤ of 2 it is necessary that the agents play w;w with
probability 1 after this message, i.e.  =  = 1 (resp.  =  = 1). But w is not a best
response for c, as can be seen by the fact that the partial derivative of (A.25) with respect
to  (resp. ) evaluated at those strategies is
1
2
(4  5
2X
k=1
k(I))
0
c(2) =  
3
8
0c(2) < 0.
Similarly, one can show that w is not a best response for r.
Case 2: When 0 < II < 1, since under II, P sends both messages with positive
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probability, it is necessary that w;w is played with probability 1 after both messages in
order that the principal always receive the maximal payo¤ of 2. A necessary condition for
this to be a best response for c is that the partial derivatives of (A.25) with respect to ; 
are non-negative at  =  =  =  = 1. This is, respectively, equivalent to 14II  19I
and 14(1  II)  19(1  I), which implies 14  19, a contradiction.
Case 3: When II = 0 and 0 < I  1, (A.25) is strictly decreasing in , thus the
maximum is attained at  = 0. For P to always receive the maximal payo¤ of 2, it is
necessary that  =  =  = 1. However, this is not a best response for r because the
partial derivative of (A.24) with respect to  evaluated at these strategies using the values
for the k is,
3
4
(
1
2
  I)0r(2 
3
4
I) + ( 
1
5
I   1)0r(2 
I
5
) < 0.
To see this, note that the second term is always negative, the rst term is non-positive for
1
2
 I  1, and, when 0 < I < 12 , substituting r(x) =  e 11x yields that the left-hand
side is negative.
Case 4: When II = 1 and 0  I < 1, the argument is identical to Case 3 except the
roles of the messages  and  are swapped.
The next result relates to analysis of the limit pricing example. Denote the entrants
Cournot prot net of entry costs when facing an incumbent of type  by w  b(a+c 2cE3b )2 
K.
Lemma A.5 Under Assumption 5.1, LP is an ex-ante equilibrium if and only if (ICH for
I), (ICM for I), wH  0 andX

()((L)wL + (M)wM)
0 ((H)wH)  0. (ICL for E)
The conditions above correspond to the following incentives in the game: (ICH for I),
(ICM for I) were described in the main text, wH  0 ensures that the entrant is willing to
enter when it is sure the incumbent is type H, and ICL for E ensures the entrant does not
want to enter after observing the monopoly quantity for type L.
Proof of Lemma A.5. Since there is complete information in the nal stage, the
Cournot or monopoly quantities respectively are ex-ante optimal there. Taking the incum-
bents point of view, consider its action in the rst stage. Since the incumbent learns its cost
before taking any action and there is no other uncertainty, checking ex-ante optimality for
the incumbent is equivalent to checking optimality for each incumbent type separately given
the entrants strategy. This is true no matter what the incumbents ambiguity aversion or
beliefs.
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When does type H not prefer to pool with M,L at the monopoly quantity for L and thereby
deter entry? Prots for H in the conjectured equilibrium are b(a cH
2b
)2 +b(a+cE 2cH
3b
)2. Prots
if it instead pools with M,L at monopoly quantity for L and deters entry are a cL
2b
(a  a cL
2
 
cH) + b(
a cH
2b
)2. H at least as well o¤ not pooling if and only if
b(
a+ cE   2cH
3b
)2  a  cL
2b
(a  a  cL
2
  cH).
This is equivalent to (ICH for I).
When does type M not prefer to produce the monopoly quantity for M and fail to deter
entry? Prots for M in the conjectured equilibrium are a cL
2b
(a   a cL
2
  cM) + b(a cM2b )2.
If it instead produced at the monopoly quantity for M and fails to deter entry, prots are
b(a cM
2b
)2 + b(a+cE 2cM
3b
)2. M is at least as well o¤ pooling with L if and only if
a  cL
2b
(a  a  cL
2
  cM)  b(a+ cE   2cM
3b
)2.
This is equivalent to (ICM for I).
Type L is playing optimally since its monopoly quantity also deters entry.
It remains to examine the entry decision of the entrant. As a best-response to the
incumbents strategy, ex-ante the entrant wants to maximizeX

() [L((L)wL + (M)wM) + H(H)wH ] (A.26)
with respect to H ; L 2 [0; 1], where H and L are the mixed-strategy probabilities of
entering contingent on seeing the monopoly quantity for H and the monopoly quantity for
L, respectively. When is this maximized at H = 1 and L = 0? Notice, by monotonicity,
some maximum involves H = 1 if and only if wH  0, and wH > 0 is equivalent to H = 1
being part of every maximum. This says that entering against a known high cost incumbent
is protable. Assuming this is satised, so that H = 1 is optimal, then L = 0 is optimal if
and only if the derivative of (A.26) with respect to L evaluated at L = 0 and H = 1 is
non-positive, which yields (ICL for E).
Before turning to the proof of Proposition 5.3, we remark that we actually prove a slightly
stronger result, allowing for the possibility that  (f j (L)wL + (M)wM = 0g) = 1 (i.e.,
that the entrant unambiguously believes that it will exactly break even if it enters conditional
on the incumbents type being in fL;Mg). This appears in the proof only in the proof of
Lemma A.6.
Proof of Proposition 5.3. Consider the limit pricing strategy prole LP.
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By Lemma A.6, under the assumptions of the proposition there exists a ^ such that if
the entrants  is at least as concave as ^, then (ICL for E) is satised. By Lemma A.5,
the assumptions of the proposition together with (ICL for E) are su¢ cient for LP to be an
ex-ante equilibrium.
Next, we construct an interim belief system that, together with LP, satises smooth rule
consistency. Consider a sequence of completely mixed strategy proles, k, where k;q > 0
is the probability that type  of the incumbent chooses rst period quantity q, kq > 0
is the probability that the entrant enters after observing quantity q, k;(q;enter;r) > 0 and
k(q;enter;r) > 0 are the probabilities of second period quantity r being chosen by, respectively,
type  of the incumbent and the entrant, after observing rst period quantity q followed by
entry and revelation of , and k;(q;no entry;r) > 0 is the probability of second period quantity
r being chosen by type  of the incumbent after observing rst period quantity q followed
by no entry. Specically, let k;q 
k;qP
q^2Q 
k
;q^
for k = 1; 2; :::, where k;q is dened by
q 2 Q
 q = qH q = qL qH 6= q < qL q > qL
L 1 k2 1 k
M 1 k2 1 1
H k2 1 k 1
, kq converge to 1 as k !1 when q < qL and converge to 0 otherwise, k;(q;enter;r) converge to
1 as k !1 when r is the Cournot quantity for type  and converge to 0 otherwise, k(q;enter;r)
converge to 1 as k ! 1 when r is the Cournot quantity for the entrant and converge to 0
otherwise, and k;(q;no entry;r) converge to 1 as k ! 1 when r is the monopoly quantity for
type  and converge to 0 otherwise. Note that k converges to LP. By Lemma A.4, Theorem
A.2 delivers an interim belief system  such that
 
LP; 

satises smooth rule consistency.
The nal step in the proof is to verify that
 
LP; 

satises the optimality conditions
(3.2) at all information sets. By Theorem 3.3, for optimality, it is su¢ cient to check against
one-stage deviations, and therefore only at information sets where the player has a non-
trivial move. The Cournot strategies in the last stage given entry are optimal because all
distributions over type become degenerate when conditioned on the entrant learning the
incumbents type. The fact that wL < 0 plus wH  0 implies that it is optimal for the
entrant to stay out if its objective function after observing q places all weight on type L and
to enter if that objective function places all weight on type H. We now verify that when
q 6= qL this objective function does exactly that when entry/no entry are supposed to occur
according to LP. Entry is supposed to occur if and only if q < qL. When q = qH , since Ii
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is the degenerate distribution on type H for all  that may be so conditioned, it is optimal
to enter. When qH 6= q < qL, since p i;LP i (; qj) places all weight on (H; q), (A.12) implies
that all  in the support of E;fqg puts weight only on (H; q), and so it is again optimal
to enter. Similarly, when q > qL, since p i;LP i (; qj) places all weight on (L; q), all  in the
support of E;fqg puts weight only on (L; q), and so it is optimal not to enter.
Not entering being optimal after observing q = qL is equivalent (see 4.1) to the following:X
2(fqLg)
((L; qL)wL + (M; qL)wM)
0(0)E;fL;MgfqLg()  0. (A.27)
Using the formula (A.12) to substitute for E;qL() in (A.27) yields that not entering re-
maining optimal is equivalent to (ICL for E). Therefore
 
LP; 

satises the optimality
conditions (3.2) at all information sets as long as the entrants  is at least as concave as
the ^ identied from Lemma A.6. For such su¢ ciently concave , having shown
 
LP; 

is
sequentially optimal and satises smooth rule consistency, it is therefore an SEA.
Since the only assumption on  made in the above argument that LP is part of an SEA
was that it was su¢ ciently concave for the entrant, the argument goes through in its entirety
for all ~ at least as concave as . Furthermore, the same sequence fkg1k=1 may be used for
all ~. Thus, LP is SEA robust to increased ambiguity aversion.
We next verify that the other conditions in the antecedents of Theorem 4.5 are satised.
We begin by showing that, for each player,
P
h2H ui(h)pLP (hjh0)(h0) can be strictly ordered
across the  in the support of . For the entrant,X
h2H
ui(h)pLP (hjh0)(h0) = (H)wH .
Thus, strict ordering corresponds to strict ordering by (H). The assumption that the
support of  can be ordered in the likelihood-ratio ordering ensures the latter, as it implies
that for any two distinct ; 0 2 supp, (H) 6= 0(H). To see this, suppose to the contrary
that (H) = 0(H). By distinctness and that weights must sum to one, (M) 6= 0(M),
(L) 6= 0(L) and (M) > 0(M) if and only if (L) < 0(L), a violation of likelihood-ratio
ordering. For the incumbent,X
h2H
ui(h)pLP (hjh0)(h0) = (L)2b(a  cL2b )
2
+(M)[
a  cL
2b
(a  a  cL
2
  cM) + b(a  cM
2b
)2]
+(H)[b(
a  cH
2b
)2 + b(
a+ cE   2cH
3b
)2].
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By Assumption 5.1 and (ICM for I), the expression multiplied by (L) is strictly larger
than the one multiplied by (M), which is, in turn, strictly larger than the one multiplied
by (H). Thus, likelihood-ratio ordering of the support of  implies strict ordering ofP
h2H ui(h)pLP (hjh0)(h0). By Theorem 4.5, ambiguity aversion makes LP SEA belief
robust.
Lemma A.6 Under the assumptions of Proposition 5.3 there exists an  > 0 such that if 
is at least as concave as  e x then (ICL for E) is satised.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the proposition. We show that (ICL for E) is satised
for concave enough . The assumption in the proposition that some  2 supp makes en-
try conditional on fL;Mg strictly unprotable means  (f j (L)wL + (M)wM < 0g) > 0.
If  (f j (L)wL + (M)wM  0g) = 1 then (ICL for E) is trivially satised for any .
For the remainder of the proof, therefore, suppose that  (f j (L)wL + (M)wM > 0g) >
0. Let    f j (L)wL + (M)wM < 0g, +  f j (L)wL + (M)wM > 0g, N P
2  ()((L)wL + (M)wM), and P 
P
2+ ()((L)wL + (M)wM). Let 
  2
arg max2  (H) and + 2 arg min2+ (H). The left-hand side of (ICL for E) can be
bounded from above as follows:X
2 
()((L)wL + (M)wM)
0 ((H)wH) +
X
2+
()((L)wL + (M)wM)
0 ((H)wH)

X
2 
()((L)wL + (M)wM)
0   (H)wH+ X
2+
()((L)wL + (M)wM)
0  +(H)wH
= N0
 
 (H)wH

+ P0
 
+(H)wH

.
Consider (x) =  e x,  > 0. The upper bound above becomes
Ne 
 (H)wH + Pe 
+(H)wH .
We show that this upper bound is non-positive for su¢ ciently large , implying (ICL for
E). The upper bound is non-positive if and only if Pe 
+(H)wH   Ne  (H)wH if and
only if e(
 (H) +(H))wH   N
P
if and only if  ( (H)  +(H))wH  ln( NP ). Since
 (L)wL +  (M)wM < 0 < +(L)wL + +(M)wM and cL < cM , we have wL < 0 < wM .
Thus, 
 (L)
 (M) >  wMwL >
+(L)
+(M)
. By our assumption on the support of  and Lemma A.7,
 (L)
 (M) >
+(L)
+(M)
implies  (H) < +(H). Therefore,  ( (H)  +(H))wH  ln( NP ) if
and only if   ln( NP )
( (H) +(H))wH .
To complete the proof, x  satisfying this inequality and consider  such that (x) =
h( e x) for all x with h concave and strictly increasing on ( 1; 0). We show that (ICL
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for E) holds. Observe that 0(x) = h0( e x)e x. Since  (H) +(H) < 0 and wH > 0,
we have
 e  (H)wH   e +(H)wH
and, by concavity of h,
h0( e  (H)wH )  h0( e +(H)wH ).
Therefore the upper bound derived above satises
N0
 
 (H)wH

+ P0
 
+(H)wH

= Ne 
 (H)wHh0( e  (H)wH ) + Pe +(H)wHh0( e +(H)wH )
 (Ne  (H)wH + Pe +(H)wH )h0( e  (H)wH )  0
by the rst part of the proof and the assumption on . This implies (ICL for E).
Lemma A.7 If the support of  can be ordered in the likelihood-ratio ordering, then, for
any ; 0 2 supp, (L)
(M)
> 
0(L)
0(M) implies (H) < 
0(H).
Proof. Suppose the support of  can be so ordered. Fix any ; 0 2 supp. Suppose
(L)
(M)
> 
0(L)
0(M) . Then
0(L)
(L)
< 
0(M)
(M)
, and thus, by likelihood-ratio ordering, 
0(L)
(L)
< 
0(M)
(M)

0(H)
(H)
. This implies 0(H) > (H) since the last two ratios cannot be less than or equal to 1
without violating the total probability summing to 1.
B Appendix: Details on the analysis of the game in
Figure 3.1 and the comparison with no protable
one-stage deviations and consistent planning
A strengthening of no protable one-stage deviations used in some of the existing literature
investigating games with ambiguity is the following condition, describing a consistent plan-
ning requirement in the spirit of Strotz (1955-56) (for a formal decision theoretic treatment
see Siniscalchi 2011):
Denition B.1 Fix a game   and a pair (; ) consisting of a strategy prole and interim
belief system. Specify Vi and Vi;Ii as in (2.1) and (2.4). For each player i and information
set Ii 2 ITi , let
CPi;Ii  argmax
^i2i
Vi;Ii(^i;  i).
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Then, inductively, for 0  t  T   1, and Ii 2 Iti let
CPi;Ii  argmax
^i2
T
I^i2It+1i jI^
 1
i
=Ii
CPi;I^i
Vi;Ii(^i;  i).
Finally, let
CPi  argmax
^i2
T
I^i2I0i
CPi;I^i
Vi(^i;  i).
(; ) is optimal under consistent planning if, for all players i,
i 2 CPi.
Equivalently, (; ) is such that for all players i,
Vi()  Vi(^i;  i) for all ^i 2
\
I^i2I0i
CPi;I^i
and, for all information sets Ii 2 Iti , 0  t  T   1,
Vi;Ii()  Vi;Ii(^i;  i) for all ^i 2
\
I^i2It+1i jI^ 1i =Ii
CPi;I^i
and, for all information sets Ii 2 ITi ,
Vi;Ii()  Vi;Ii(^i;  i) for all ^i 2 i.
If (; ) is sequentially optimal then it is also optimal under consistent planning. However,
if (; ) is optimal under consistent planning it may fail to be sequentially optimal (even
when limiting attention to ambiguity neutrality). For such a failure to occur, the optimal
strategy from player is point of view at some earlier stage must have a continuation that
fails to be optimal from the viewpoint of some later reachable stage. This is what makes the
extra constraints imposed in the optimization inequalities under consistent planning bind.
Just as with no protable one-stage deviations, when updating is according to the smooth
rule, (; ) optimal under consistent planning implies (; ) is sequentially optimal, making
the three equivalent under smooth rule updating.
Recall that the example in Figure 3.1 in Section 3.2 showed how the no protable one-
stage deviation criterion under Bayesian updating allowed strategy proles that are not ex-
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ante equilibria of a game (and thus clearly not sequentially optimal). Replacing no protable
one-stage deviations by consistent planning does not change this fact. The main text used
the following specication of preferences for the example: 1(x) =  e 10x,  is 1=2 on
(1=3; 1=9; 5=9) and 1=2 on (1=3; 5=9; 1=9), and 1s beliefs after seeing U are given by Bayes
rule applied to : 1=3 on (3=4; 1=4; 0) and 2=3 on (3=8; 5=8; 0). With these parameters
and beliefs, the following strategy prole satises no protable one-stage deviations and
consistent planning: player 1 plays o with probability 1  9
20
ln(29
11
)  0:564 and mixes evenly
between u and d if U , while player 2 plays her strictly dominant strategy if given the move.
Notice, if we consider any more concave 1, playing o with even higher probability will be
consistent with consistent planning or no protable one-stage deviations given these beliefs.
In the limit where the decision maker is Maxmin EU with set of priors equal to the convex
combinations of (1=3; 1=9; 5=9) and (1=3; 5=9; 1=9) and applies Bayesrule to each measure in
the set, playing o with probability 1 is consistent with consistent planning and no protable
one-stage deviations.
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